Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

During the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).     

On the Road to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) highlighted two issues in particular—progress toward a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction–Free Zone and the Joint Statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—that may not only greatly affect the health and vitality of the NPT and the 2015 RevCon, but possibly also have implications for the international nonproliferation regime as a whole. Dr. William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interviewed Ambassador Cornel Feruta, chairman of the 2013 PrepCom, to discuss these and other issues related to the meeting and the future of the treaty and its review process.     

One size does not fit all: personalized incentives in military compensation

A critical element in implementing a compensation scheme including nonmonetary incentives (NMIs) is recognizing that preferences vary widely across Service members. There are at least three sources of variability: across different population classes, across individuals within a population class, and across NMI packages for a particular individual. Surveys across different military communities, ranks, and years of Service show the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50% of the active duty force. At the same time, approximately 80% of the surveyed Service members expressed a significant positive value for at least one NMI. Therefore, one-size-fits-all incentive packages will not be nearly as effective as more personalized incentive packages. The authors discuss variability in Service member NMI preferences and outline an approach to implementing personalized NMI packages in military compensation through a sealed-bid reverse auction, where Service members select individual NMIs from a “cafeteria-style” menu of options.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

To Protect and Serve: Civilian Policing and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo

Since the end of the Cold War the process of nation building has become a priority in the attempt to maintain world order and security in the wake of the instability and devastation wrought by failed and war-torn states. The proliferation of nation-building missions has led to their diversification and the need to marshal a vast array of resources in order to attain substantial levels of success. This article deals with a new and important component of peacekeeping and nation-building missions, that of civilian policing. The article outlines the goals of using civilian police officers in nation-building missions and discusses a variety of problems (pragmatic, legal, and cultural) that policing may introduce to such missions. This discussion is focused around the civilian policing component of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. It delineates the successes and hardships so far experienced during the mission in Kosovo and explores the insights that the mission may provide for similar projects in the future.     

Homeland Security and Intelligence: Can Oil Mix with Water in an Open Society?

The newest US Cabinet department is Homeland Security (DHS). One of the most controversial aspects in the process of developing this entity is the role of intelligence in providing information on the increasing terrorist threat. This article examines the intelligence challenges for homeland security. In doing so, it explores the problems of merging disparate cultures - law enforcement vs intelligence, civil entities vs military, federal vs state and local jurisdictions, and domestic focus vs international perspective. Given the nature of the globalized, asymmetric threat, the need for more and better intelligence sharing is obvious. Terrorists and other criminals do not respect international boundaries; in fact, they exploit them in an effort to prevent effective and timely countermeasures. This demands that robust multinational collaboration and interagency coordination be practiced.