全文获取类型
收费全文 | 95篇 |
免费 | 0篇 |
出版年
2019年 | 3篇 |
2018年 | 2篇 |
2017年 | 1篇 |
2016年 | 2篇 |
2015年 | 1篇 |
2014年 | 3篇 |
2013年 | 40篇 |
2011年 | 1篇 |
2008年 | 1篇 |
2007年 | 2篇 |
2005年 | 2篇 |
2004年 | 1篇 |
2003年 | 2篇 |
2002年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 3篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 1篇 |
1984年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 3篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
1973年 | 2篇 |
1972年 | 1篇 |
1971年 | 1篇 |
1969年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有95条查询结果,搜索用时 109 毫秒
91.
Over the past several decades, NATO allies have debated the relative burdens and benefits of NATO membership. Recently, this concern surfaced as members debated the magnitude and distribution of NATO expansion costs. This paper presents an economic model of defence alliances to identify the benefits and burdens of alliance membership. It suggests that defence expenditures provide public benefits if alliance members share common interests and mutual commitment; defence expenditures provide private benefits if countries lack common interests and mutual commitment. The model's results are used to discuss NATO's evolving roles and missions, NATO expansion and burden sharing across NATO members. 相似文献
92.
This report explores Iranian popular opinion on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the determinants of Iranian attitudes. Using data from a 2008 survey of 710 Iranians administered by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, we find that that a significant minority of Iranians (10 percent in 2006 and 14 percent in 2008) would prefer that Iran withdraw from the NPT. Our statistical analysis shows that Iranians who fear a US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and distrust the International Atomic Energy Agency are more likely to want to quit the NPT. We therefore argue that those who do not trust other nations are most likely to oppose the NPT. 相似文献
93.
William C. Potter 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):135-158
An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them. 相似文献
94.
95.
William Moon 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):613-634
ABSTRACTAs the United States and North Korea pursue negotiations on a “denuclearization” agreement, the two countries should consider initiating cooperative measures as a way to build confidence and encourage finalization of a complete agreement. Based on lessons from the initial engagements carried out under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), initial cooperation should focus on safety and security, training, and infrastructure elimination. By offering to implement these initiatives now while negotiations are underway, the United States could gain additional insights into North Korean intentions. These early initiatives could be proposed without compromising the US maximum-pressure campaign on North Korea by using the current authorities of the CTR program and carefully designing specific exemptions that may be required for any agreed measures. If North Korea is truly interested in pursuing disarmament efforts, the initial cooperative projects would enable them to begin reaping potential benefits while negotiations continue with sanctions still in place. These initial proposals could also be expanded to include additional international partners such as Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan. Such programs and initiatives would support and supplement longer-term strategies to address North Korean weapons-of-mass-destruction challenges. 相似文献