Service design at diagnostic service centers

We study a service design problem in diagnostic service centers, call centers that provide medical advice to patients over the phone about what the appropriate course of action is, based on the caller's symptoms. Due to the tension between increased diagnostic accuracy and the increase in waiting times more in‐depth service requires, managers face a difficult decision in determining the optimal service depth to guide the diagnostic process. The specific problem we consider models the situation when the capacity (staffing level) at the center is fixed, and when the callers have both congestion‐ and noncongestion‐related costs relating to their call. We develop a queueing model incorporating these features and find that the optimal service depth can take one of two different structures, depending on factors such as the nurses' skill level and the maximum potential demand. Sensitivity analyses of the two optimal structures show that they are quite different. In some situations, it may (or may not) be optimal for the manager to try to expand the demand at the center, and increasing skill level may (or may not) increase congestion. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

French intervention in Mali: strategic alliances,long-term regional presence?

The March 2012 coup in Mali opened the door to expanded territorial occupation in northern Mali by Tuareg separatists and subsequently armed Islamist extremists. French forces intervened at the behest of the interim government in Mali. This article examines how various actors frame the conflict to their advantage. While the Malian government and France are allies, the position of various Tuareg actors shift over time as they strategize and weigh the value of allegiance with the French. Local extremist organizations are labeled as terrorists and are targeted as enemies. This article argues that the conflict has been decontextualized and framed within the ‘war on terror’. France’s decision to intervene and to expand their regional military presence, rather than exit, is legitimized by the framing of their intervention as integral to counterterrorism efforts.     

A characterization of optimal base‐stock levels for a multistage serial supply chain

In this article, we present a multistage model to optimize inventory control decisions under stochastic demand and continuous review. We first formulate the general problem for continuous stages and use a decomposition solution approach: since it is never optimal to let orders cross, the general problem can be broken into a set of single‐unit subproblems that can be solved in a sequential fashion. These subproblems are optimal control problems for which a differential equation must be solved. This can be done easily by recursively identifying coefficients and performing a line search. The methodology is then extended to a discrete number of stages and allows us to compute the optimal solution in an efficient manner, with a competitive complexity. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 32–46, 2016     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

Nonlinear pricing with consumer satiation

In various scenarios, consumers may become satiated with products, and the degree of satiation is directly associated with their prior experiences. Confronted with consumer satiation, the seller is unable to either identify consumers who have a higher likelihood of being satiated ex ante or distinguish satiated from non‐satiated consumers ex post. Therefore, the seller should address dynamic selling, valuation uncertainty, and quantity decisions, all of which are important operational issues. We consider a two‐period problem in which consumer types are influenced by their prior consumption experiences. Faced with these consumers, the seller intends to optimize quantities and adjust the prices of the products in each period to maximize revenue. We find that the seller may reduce ex ante production quantity as some consumers become satiated. Moreover, the ex ante quantity is first decreasing and then increasing with regard to the satiation rate. Furthermore, two‐period information asymmetries may provide a rationale for upward distortion in quantity when consumer preferences are highly sensitive to first‐period consumption. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 386–400, 2016     

Optimal pricing and scheduling control of product shipping

In this article, we seek to understand how a capacity‐constrained seller optimally prices and schedules product shipping to customers who are heterogeneous on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to wait (WTW). The capacity‐constrained seller does not observe each customer's WTP and WTW and knows only the aggregate distributions of WTP and WTW. The seller's problem is modeled as an M/M/N_s queueing model with multiclass customers and multidimensional information screening. We contribute to the literature by providing an optimal and efficient algorithm. Furthermore, we numerically find that customers with a larger waiting cost enjoys a higher scheduling priority, but customers with higher valuation do not necessarily get a higher scheduling priority. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 215–227, 2015     

Inventory competition with yield reliability improvement

This article studies the inventory competition under yield uncertainty. Two firms with random yield compete for substitutable demand: If one firm suffers a stockout, which can be caused by yield failure, its unsatisfied customers may switch to its competitor. We first study the case in which two competing firms decide order quantities based on the exogenous reliability levels. The results from the traditional inventory competition are generalized to the case with yield uncertainty and we find that quantity and reliability can be complementary instruments in the competition. Furthermore, we allow the firms to endogenously improve their yield reliability before competing in quantity. We show that the reliability game is submodular under some assumptions. The results indicate that the competition in quantity can discourage the reliability improvement. With an extensive numerical study, we also demonstrate the robustness of our analytical results in more general settings. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 107–126, 2015     

Technical note – operational statistics: Properties and the risk‐averse case

Consider a repeated newsvendor problem for managing the inventory of perishable products. When the parameter of the demand distribution is unknown, it has been shown that the traditional separated estimation and optimization (SEO) approach could lead to suboptimality. To address this issue, an integrated approach called operational statistics (OS) was developed by Chu et al., Oper Res Lett 36 (2008) 110–116. In this note, we first study the properties of this approach and compare its performance with that of the traditional SEO approach. It is shown that OS is consistent and superior to SEO. The benefit of using OS is larger when the demand variability is higher. We then generalize OS to the risk‐averse case under the conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) criterion. To model risk from both demand sampling and future demand uncertainty, we introduce a new criterion, called the total CVaR, and find the optimal OS under this new criterion. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 206–214, 2015     

Transformations of node‐balanced routing problems

This article describes a polynomial transformation for a class of unit‐demand vehicle routing problems, named node‐balanced routing problems (BRP), where the number of nodes on each route is restricted to be in an interval such that the workload across the routes is balanced. The transformation is general in that it can be applied to single or multiple depot, homogeneous or heterogeneous fleet BRPs, and any combination thereof. At the heart of the procedure lies transforming the BRP into a generalized traveling salesman problem (TSP), which can then be transformed into a TSP. The transformed graph exhibits special properties which can be exploited to significantly reduce the number of arcs, and used to construct a formulation for the resulting TSP that amounts to no more than that of a constrained assignment problem. Computational results on a number of instances are presented. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 370–387, 2015     

Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game

When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 203–216, 2017