How not to pay for the war

As a result of allied subsidy and the influence of sunk costs, the marginal cost of the Gulf War to the US was reduced to negligible size. This result is at variance with the Olson‐Zeckhauser thesis that in an alliance “the small exploit the large.” A game theoretic alternative explanation suggests that the relation between allies resembles the game of Chicken, successfully played by the US. The ability to shift the marginal costs of war in the short term raises questions about the possible underestimation of long term effects.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

Decommissioning and paramilitary strategy in Northern Ireland: A problem compared

This study examines the problems of paramilitary decommissioning in Northern Ireland. It analyses why decommissioning has become so contentious in the Northern Ireland peace process. Decommissioning, though, is not a unique or intrinsically insurmountable problem. This is demonstrated by highlighting the issue in international context. Three examples of decommissioning in conflict resolution processes are assessed: the Lebanon, El Salvador and Mozambique. These varied examples do supply some limited lessons for Northern Ireland. This study argues that the explanation for the intractability of decommissioning in Northern Ireland resides, to a greater extent, in the tactical and strategic reasoning of the main paramilitary groupings in Northern Ireland. The factors that condition their thinking, however, can be found in the nature of the peace process itself which provides the paramilitiaries with every incentive to retain possession of their weapons.     

Gas and the North‐West Frontier

John Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U Boat Wars 1916 ‐1945. London: Leo Cooper, 1989. Pp.xx + 841; £19.50.

Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Armies: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Pp.xvi + 359; index; illustrations. £37.50 (hardback).

Keith Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1989. Pp.xiv + 188; £35.

Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Pp.xii + 244; £12.95.

Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson (eds.), Limits to Soviet Power. Lexington, MA/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989. Pp.vii + 231; $35.

Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South‐East Asia. London and New York: Routledge, 1989. Pp.x + 198; £30.

Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter‐measures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edn. 1989. Pp.xv + 248; £27.50 (hardback); £10.95 (paperback).

John F. Murphy, Punishing International Terrorists: The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives. Totowa, NJ: Rowman &; Allanheld 1985. Pp.x + 142; $25.95.

Hanns Maull and Otto Pick (eds.), The Gulf War. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. Pp.193; £30.

Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1989. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989. Pp.xxviii + 361; £35.

Virginia Gamba‐Stonehouse, Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. Pp.xiii + 155; £30.

Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front. London: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1989. Pp.194; £25.

Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1989. Pp.183; £19.50.

Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. University Press of America, 1988. Pp.xiv + 347; $16.75 (paperback). (First Published, 1962).     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.     

In the right place at the right time: US signals intelligence relations with Scandinavia,1945–1960

This paper demonstrates that US–Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed. Bilateral US intelligence liaison relations with nominally neutral Sweden were of particular importance in the early years of the Cold War given its geographic location adjacent to the northwestern portion of the USSR. Moreover, the importance of Sigint received from the three principal Scandinavian countries covered by this paper (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) proved to be quite important to the US intelligence community during the early years of the Cold War, when the US Sigint infrastructure was relatively weak and stretched thin by commitments in Asia and elsewhere. This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations, demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by.