Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

The discrete evasion game with three-move lag

The discrete evasion game with three-move lag, formulated over 30 years ago, was one of the earliest games with time-lag complications. This game remains unsolved even though it is well known that the game has a value. In this article we obtain an upper bound for the value by constructing a strategy which consists of 400 conditional probabilities for the minimizing player. This is believed to be the best upper bound known.     

Application of dirichlet integrals for curtailment problems in sampling inspection

The standard problem in sampling inspection is to consider plans with and without curtailment. Curtailment causes difficulty and authors rarely give exact results (i.e., exact OC and ASN functions) for curtailed procedures. In this article we regard curtailment as an inverse sampling procedure and use Dirichlet integrals to obtain exact formulas for the OC, the ASN, and also the variance of the number of observations required under three types of plans: no curtailment, semicurtailment (for rejection only) and two-sided curtailment. Different sections of the article deal with the single sample, the two-stage, and the multiple-stage sampling problems. New tables for carrying out the single-sample procedure are included in the article. The authors feel that this article presents new directions and new ways of dealing with problems associated with quality control.     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997     

Optimal inventory and dynamic admission policies for a retailer of seasonal products with affiliate programs and drop‐shipping

This article investigates the optimal inventory and admission policies for a “Clicks‐and‐Bricks” retailer of seasonal products that, in addition to selling through its own physical and online stores, also sells through third‐party websites by means of affiliate programs. Through postings on partners' webpages, an affiliate program allows a retailer to attract customers who would otherwise be missed. However, this retailer needs to pay a commission for each sale that originates from the website operators participating in the program. The retailer may also refer online orders to other sources (such as distributors and manufacturers) for fulfillment through a drop‐shipping agreement and thus earns commissions. This would be an option when, for example, the inventories at the physical stores were running low. Therefore, during the selling horizon, the retailer needs to dynamically control the opening/closing of affiliate programs and decide on the fulfillment option for online orders. On the basis of a discrete‐time dynamic programming model, the optimal admission policy of the retailer is investigated in this paper, and the structural properties of the revenue function are characterized. Numerical examples are given to show the revenue impact of optimal admission control. The optimal initial stocking decisions at the physical stores are also studied. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Relaxation method for the solution of the minimax location-allocation problem in euclidean space

A method previously devised for the solution of the p-center problem on a network has now been extended to solve the analogous minimax location-allocation problem in continuous space. The essence of the method is that we choose a subset of the n points to be served and consider the circles based on one, two, or three points. Using a set-covering algorithm we find a set of p such circles which cover the points in the relaxed problem (the one with m < n points). If this is possible, we check whether the n original points are covered by the solution; if so, we have a feasible solution to the problem. We now delete the largest circle with radius r_p (which is currently an upper limit to the optimal solution) and try to find a better feasible solution. If we have a feasible solution to the relaxed problem which is not feasible to the original, we augment the relaxed problem by adding a point, preferably the one which is farthest from its nearest center. If we have a feasible solution to the original problem and we delete the largest circle and find that the relaxed problem cannot be covered by p circles, we conclude that the latest feasible solution to the original problem is optimal. An example of the solution of a problem with ten demand points and two and three service points is given in some detail. Computational data for problems of 30 demand points and 1–30 service points, and 100, 200, and 300 demand points and 1–3 service points are reported.     

Parallel machine scheduling with batch deliveries to minimize total flow time and delivery cost

Motivated by the flow of products in the iron and steel industry, we study an identical and parallel machine scheduling problem with batch deliveries, where jobs finished on the parallel machines are delivered to customers in batches. Each delivery batch has a capacity and incurs a cost. The objective is to find a coordinated production and delivery schedule that minimizes the total flow time of jobs plus the total delivery cost. This problem is an extension of the problem considered by Hall and Potts, Ann Oper Res 135 (2005) 41–64, who studied a two‐machine problem with an unbounded number of transporters and unbounded delivery capacity. We first provide a dynamic programming algorithm to solve a special case with a given job assignment to the machines. A heuristic algorithm is then presented for the general problem, and its worst‐case performance ratio is analyzed. The computational results show that the heuristic algorithm can generate near‐optimal solutions. Finally, we offer a fully polynomial‐time approximation scheme for a fixed number of machines. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 492–502, 2016