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911.
We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007 相似文献
912.
Traffic is the lifeblood of every e-commerce platform. The question of how to channel traffic to merchants operating on a platform lies at the heart of platform management. We consider a platform on which two independent merchants sell their products. Merchants compete on inventory in the sense that some of the unmet demand at one merchant will spill over to the other. The platform channels traffic based on products' conversion rates to maximize the total sale on the platform. We show that traffic channeling plays three roles. First, it allows more efficient allocation of traffic; that is, the merchant with a high conversion rate is given a higher priority in receiving traffic. Second, it allows the platform to control demand spillover between the merchants to maximize total sales. The platform either facilitates or prevents demand spillover, depending on product substitutability. Third, traffic channeling intensifies competition between the merchants and hence increases the total inventory. More efficient allocation of traffic and the increase in inventory increase sales inequality between the merchants. In contrast, demand spillover decreases sales inequality. While the platform always benefits from traffic channeling, the merchants do not benefit when their products are moderately substitutable. Interestingly, when the two products are owned and sold by the same merchant, the opposite happens–traffic channeling always benefits the merchant but may hurt the platform. Our study provides a basis for informed discussions on how platforms should channel traffic in response to conversion rates, and how traffic channeling affects the welfare of merchants and platforms. 相似文献