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1.
本文求解如下的组合对策问题:设有一堆棋子,总数N 是奇数,甲乙两人轮流取子,每人每次可取一颗、二颗,最多可取s 颗,但不能不取,直至取完后分别来数甲乙两人所取棋子的总数,总数为奇数者获胜。站在甲的立场上考虑获胜的策略,文中解决了如下两个问题:(Ⅰ)总数N 应是什么样的奇数,甲才有获胜策略;(Ⅱ)当N 一定时,甲应采取什么样的策略取子,才能获胜。  相似文献   
2.
使用对策论的观点和方法 ,结合搜索论的知识 ,建立了一类搜索 -规避对抗对策模型 .对模型的结论做了系统分析 ,考虑了对策双方的最优策略及使用 .  相似文献   
3.
This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λi (μi) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that pi(1 ? exp(?λixi)) (pi(1 ? exp(?μiyi))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort xi (yi) applied at point i where pi ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q1 and Player 2 gets q2 where q1 + q2 ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
4.
Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
5.
Under quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017  相似文献   
6.
We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.  相似文献   
7.
在装备合同履行中存在着明显的信息不对称现象。为提高装备合同的履行效益,减少信息不对称的影响,在有限理性假设的前提下,建立了装备合同履行监督的动态演化博弈模型。对合同履行过程中承制单位与军事代表、合同履行管理部门之间的博弈关系进行了探究,得到了各参与方在不同条件下均衡策略的选择,并对优化装备合同的履行管理提出了建议。  相似文献   
8.
针对网络攻防环境中防御方以提高系统生存能力为目的所进行的最优生存防御策略的选取问题,提出了一种基于完全信息动态博弈理论的生存防御策略优化配置算法。将恶意攻击方、故障意外事件及防御方作为博弈的参与人,提出了一种混合战略模式下的三方动态博弈模型,对博弈的主要信息要素进行了说明,以混合战略纳什均衡理论为基础,将原纳什均衡条件式的表达式转化为可计算数值结果的表达式,并据此增加了近似的概念,最后,将提出的模型和近似纳什均衡求解算法应用到一个网络实例中,结果证明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。  相似文献   
9.
将知识管理的思想引入到装备维修中,认为装备维修组织与高技术装备生产厂家之间的知识共享是提升高技术装备维修能力的重要因素。通过建立知识共享模型,对装备维修组织与高技术装备生产厂家知识共享过程进行了分析,得出知识总量螺旋上升的结果。在此基础上进行博弈分析,运用数学方法,找出主导高技术装备维修知识共享活动的关键因素,并结合实际,研究应对方法,推动装备维修知识共享,促进装备维修组织知识创新,从而提高装备维修能力。  相似文献   
10.
There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.  相似文献   
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