排序方式: 共有3条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Jean‐Paul Azam † 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(4):343-364
We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented. 相似文献
2.
Anders Corr 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):127-147
Nuclear proliferation, lax security standards in the storage of fissile materials, and international apathy in the prosecution of terrorists make nuclear terror a serious threat to the United States and its allies, yet no doctrine of retaliation has been established. To decrease the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, a doctrine of retaliation—a negligence doctrine—should be considered. If the United States can distinguish whose fissile material was used for a nuclear terror event, a negligence doctrine would prescribe retaliation against that state. Where the proximate cause—terrorists—is unavailable for deterrent retaliation, deterring an accessible mediate cause—a state that has failed to adequately secure its fissile material—is one of a few effective alternatives. In the absence of such a negligence doctrine, the United States and its allies are increasingly vulnerable to a nuclear terror attack and the ensuing negative consequences. 相似文献
3.
验前信息在射击精度评估中的应用 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
验前信息的获取与合理应用是Bayes方法在武器系统射击精度评估中的关键。对验前信息的获取、验前信息的可信度及其计算进行了阐述,提出了考虑验前信息可信度的射击精度Bayes评估新方法,为武器系统射击精度评估提出了新思路。 相似文献
1