一个组合对策问题的解

本文求解如下的组合对策问题:设有一堆棋子,总数N 是奇数,甲乙两人轮流取子,每人每次可取一颗、二颗,最多可取s 颗,但不能不取,直至取完后分别来数甲乙两人所取棋子的总数,总数为奇数者获胜。站在甲的立场上考虑获胜的策略,文中解决了如下两个问题:(Ⅰ)总数N 应是什么样的奇数,甲才有获胜策略;(Ⅱ)当N 一定时,甲应采取什么样的策略取子,才能获胜。     

C~3I系统分析的分层策略

通过对Ｃ３Ｉ系统体系结构的多维多层次性特征的分析,表明Ｃ３Ｉ系统分析的分层策略是一种突出系统整体性,体现系统相关性,实现从定性到定量综合集成的有效方略,可以应用于Ｃ３Ｉ系统分析的各个阶段。     

火力使用策略的集对分析与评价

对不确定理论──集对分析理论［１］中关于联系度的算法作了修改,给出了更有实际意义的联系度公式。应用此公式采用同异反决策分析的方法,首先对“火力使用策略”进行定性分析,把影响火力使用的７对主要矛盾看作７个集对,定义每集对的同异反三属性的测量要素。通过求各集对的联系度所在问题的解,达到择优最佳“火力使用策略”的目的,从而对战役行动起到指导或辅助决策的作用。     

时序逻辑的并行描述与隐含遍历

随着电路规模的迅速增长,设计验证越来越复杂,从而需要高速的数据处理系统。基于总线型多机系统环境,研究电路网表和布尔表达式的BDD（Binary Decision Diagram）并行构造方法,并通过隐含遍历任务的动态调度设计有效地完成时序逻辑的状态遍历。     

Slow failure: Understanding America’s quagmire in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

The United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations.     

智能搜救机器人在障碍地形的自主构型规划

为了解决带有辅助摆臂的智能搜救机器人自动规划构型以实现自主越障的难题,提出一种能够适应复杂地面形状的搜救机器人越障构型规划新方法,其核心是一种高适应性、高效率的机器人姿态预测算法。通过将地形表示为离散的点集,建立了搜救机器人的单侧姿态预测数学模型;进一步提出了快速求解该问题的算法,每秒可预测1 000～1 500个姿态。基于此,设计了机器人越障过程中状态、动作的评价指标,运用动态规划算法与滚动优化思想构建了具有优化能力的、能够实时运行的构型规划器。仿真与实物实验的结果表明,该方法能够使机器人自主调整构型穿越复杂地形,且相较强化学习算法和人工操作具有更平稳的越障效果。     

What is the global landpower network and what value might it provide?

US national security guidance, as well as the US Army’s operational experiences since 2001, emphasizes the importance of working closely with partner countries to achieve US strategic objectives. The US Army has introduced the global landpower network (GLN) concept as a means to integrate, sustain and advance the Army’s considerable ongoing efforts to meet US national security guidance. This study develops the GLN concept further, and addresses three questions. What benefits can the GLN provide the Army? What are the essential components of the GLN? What options exist for implementing the GLN concept? By developing the GLN concept, the Army has the opportunity to transition the GLN from an often ad hoc and reactive set of relationships to one that the Army more self-consciously prioritizes and leverages as a resource to meet US strategic objectives.     

美军电子信息装备系统集成技术评析

信息综合集成技术已成为电子信息装备研发的重要手段。叙述了美军最新电子信息装备综合集成技术的发展目标、发展重心和发展措施;介绍了美军信息装备综合集成技术发展策略和方法;分析了其主要功能及技术特性;并对美军电子信息装备的发展现状、技术水准和存在的问题给予了较为客观的评价。     

Europe,Russia and the Ukraine crisis: the dynamics of coercion

This article analyses European strategy towards Russia during the Ukraine crisis between February 2014 and December 2015, conceptualising it as a coercive diplomatic strategy and analysing the relationship between its ends, ways and means. European strategy sought to reverse Russian intervention. However, this overarching aim was flanked by two ‘constraining’ aims of avoiding an escalation of the conflict and a breakdown of relations with Russia. The strategy shifted between these aims, which proved to be irreconcilable: while the EU partly succeeded in containing the conflict, it failed to reverse Russian intervention and relations between the EU and Russia deteriorated sharply.     

Strategy,theory, and history: Operation Husky 1943

In his 1987 work Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987), Edward Luttwak described strategy as a field of activity characterised not only by an innately complex relationship between designs, actions and outcomes, but so too by the frequent disparity between its theory and praxis. Similar observations on this subject have since been made by Richard K. Betts, Lawrence Freedman and Antulio Echevarria II. This article will use the Allied invasion of Sicily in July–August 1943 as a vehicle through which to test these theories against a signal event in the European theatre of the Second World War. It will illustrate how Operation Husky and its aftermath are a paradigm of the confusing and often illogical course of events associated with the process of formulating strategy and waging war. In so doing it demonstrates the benefits of using strategic theory to illuminate events and so move beyond the often insular focus of campaign histories, and simultaneously reinforces the importance of military history in informing a theoretical understanding of strategy.