Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory

Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia, because of the country's technological lag and limited resources, should respond asymmetrically to the Western technology challenge. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, maintain that Russia must respond in kind. If not, the country will no longer be able to defend its sovereignty. The currently ongoing radical reform of the Russian military is a partial victory for the modernists, but which model or mix of models that will dominate in the future is first of all dependent on the Russian military's purchasing power and the state of the domestic defence industry.     

Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience

National security conception or securitization theory frames threats and conceptualizes the responses towards them. But in many cases, and especially in the Israeli context, there is a tendency to blur the nature and essence of different threats; security threats become strategic threats and then existential threats. In the Israeli context, because the broad concept of security is perceived, in most cases, as equivalent to military security, the meaning of the strategic threat will be framed, mostly, militarily, derived from military thought.

The article examines the nature of existential threats in the Israeli context and seeks to find the implications of securitization theory in this regard by analyzing the unique role of the military establishment and the influence of the military thought on strategic thought in Israel. The article also deals with the centrality of ‘military wisdom’ in the Israeli ethos and the sense of insecurity embedded in the Israeli narrative that leads to an ‘intellectual symbiosis’ between the political and the military echelons and finds this phenomenon as one of the major explanations for the influence of the military establishment on defining the nature of security threats as well as on the crucial decision to launch wars.     

Economic Development and Military Effectiveness

Abstract

What makes some states more militarily powerful than others? A growing body of research suggests that certain ‘non-material’ factors significantly affect a country's ability to translate resources into fighting power. In particular, recent studies claim that democracy, Western culture, high levels of human capital, and amicable civil-military relations enhance military effectiveness. If these studies are correct, then military power is not solely or even primarily determined by material resources, and a large chunk of international relations scholarship has been based on a flawed metric. The major finding of this article, however, suggests that this is not the case. In hundreds of battles between 1898 and 1987, the more economically developed side consistently outfought the poorer side on a soldier-for-soldier basis. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that many of the non-material factors posited to affect military capability seem to be irrelevant: when economic development is taken into account, culture and human capital become insignificant and democracy actually seems to degrade warfighting capability. In short, the conventional military dominance of Western democracies stems from superior economic development, not societal pathologies or political institutions. Therefore, a conception of military power that takes into account both the quantity of a state's resources and its level of economic development provides a sound basis for defense planning and international relations scholarship.     

Is there a Greek‐Turkish arms race?: Evidence from cointegration and causality tests†

Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and are two of the principal players in the Balkan region. Their respective defence burdens (i.e. the share of military expenditure to GDP) are the highest in NATO. Their bilateral relations are marred by serious friction and conflict of interest and have on a number of occasions come close to an armed confrontation. Their strategic interaction and mutual weapons build‐up has recently attracted the attention of researchers in the field testing the hypothesis of a Greek‐Turkish arms race with conflicting results. This paper, using cointegration and causality tests, finds evidence of a systematic armaments competition between the two countries provided that a defence policy regime shift estimated to occur in 1985 is explicitly taken into consideration. This policy regime change is associated with the stagnation of defence spending in Greece owing to the gradual deterioration of Greek public finances over the last decade.     

DOES MILITARY EXPENDITURE MATTER FOR INFLATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH?

This paper sets up a monetary endogenous growth model, and uses it to explain the ambiguous linkage between the military burden and the inflation rate observed in existing empirical studies. It is found that an expansion in the military burden has an ambiguous effect on the inflation rate depending upon the relative extent of two conflicting forces. More specifically, if the increase in the marginal benefit from holding money exceeds (falls short of) the increase in the marginal product of private capital, the inflation rate will rise (fall) in response. Moreover, it is found that an increase in the military burden will stimulate the balanced growth rate, confirming Benoit’s famous empirical findings.     

Military Spending,Conflict and External Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa

The damaging economic effects of the debt crises on Africa in the late 1980s encouraged considerable research on the determinants of external debt in developing economies. Although sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) debt was cut by two-thirds by 2008, through two debt relief programmes, debt in the region has since been rising at an increasingly rapid pace. This study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of external debt in SSA over the period 1960–2016, using dynamic panel methods. It also considers two potentially important factors that have received relatively little attention. One is military spending, rarely considered, despite a number of well-publicised scandals over the procurement of unnecessary and expensive high-tech weapons systems. A second, is the possibility that the countries studied have been involved in conflict. The empirical results point to a positive impact of military spending on external debt, but with some evidence of heterogeneity across the countries. Furthermore, findings indicate that the positive effect of military expenditure on debt becomes more marked in countries that have been affected by conflict. These results imply that policies to improve security and reduce military spending could be beneficial in reducing external debt and, potentially, improving economic performance in the region.     

自尊在军校大学生感戴与亲社会行为间的中介作用

军校大学生的感戴状况处于中等水平,军校大学生的亲社会行为处于中等偏上水平,且感戴与亲社会行为各维度之间均存在显著正相关,感戴能够直接预测亲社会行为,也能通过自尊影响个体的亲社会行为,即自尊在感戴与亲社会行为间起一定的中介作用;高感戴的军校大学生其亲社会行为较高,而自尊是亲社会行为的保护因素,个体自尊水平越高,更容易有亲社会行为。     

Development and conflict in the Balkans: Catch-up and military expenditure

This paper analyses the convergence between countries in relation to the catch-up hypothesis concerning the level of total productivity. The catch-up hypothesis claims that poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries through the international diffusion of knowledge and technology. We test this hypothesis for the Balkan countries and investigate the effect of military expenditure in the region on productivity growth. The aim is to investigate empirically whether productivity growth has been greater in countries with lower military expenditure, in line with theory. The results obtained show that, overall, improvements in technological change co-exist with deteriorating technical efficiency change and that there is a negative correlation between military expenditure and either total productivity growth and technological change, and a positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship with technical efficiency change. We conclude that economic growth is the key to regional development and that too great a diversion of resources to military commitments can lead to overstretch.