利用径向力平衡飞行控制的航天器高精度轨道捕获方法

为实现对探测器轨道形状与高度的精准调整,提出一种径向力平衡飞行的航天器连续推力控制新方法。建立连续推力平衡飞行的动力学极坐标模型,并推导出特殊条件下的解析轨道解,进一步分析边值条件,给出连续推力的控制律。利用这一平衡飞行控制理论,构建轨道捕获的最优控制策略。考虑推力器的推力水平,通过一次或多次的控制过程,实现对轨道形状、轨道高度及轨道相位的综合调整。数值仿真表明:利用平衡飞行的轨道控制方法,配置微小推力器的空间引力波探测器可以实现高精度的轨道捕获;该方法具有控制过程可解析、计算量小、简便、实用等特点。     

涡轮增压机组的功率平衡计算方法

介绍了舰船蒸汽动力装置中增压锅炉的计算特性,并在对已有的一些相关计算模型分析的基础上,描述了涡轮增压机组的功率平衡计算难题。针对该难题给出了涡轮增压机组的功率平衡计算流程和计算中有关问题的处理方法,在确保计算完备可行的前提下,该方法适合于工程应用。     

基于三方动态博弈模型的网络生存防御策略优化配置

针对网络攻防环境中防御方以提高系统生存能力为目的所进行的最优生存防御策略的选取问题,提出了一种基于完全信息动态博弈理论的生存防御策略优化配置算法。将恶意攻击方、故障意外事件及防御方作为博弈的参与人,提出了一种混合战略模式下的三方动态博弈模型,对博弈的主要信息要素进行了说明,以混合战略纳什均衡理论为基础,将原纳什均衡条件式的表达式转化为可计算数值结果的表达式,并据此增加了近似的概念,最后,将提出的模型和近似纳什均衡求解算法应用到一个网络实例中,结果证明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

信息化条件下基于大数据的后装一体化保障构想

由于契约的不完全性、专用性资产的存在,导致民企参军的谈判过程中,一方可能利用另一方因专用性资产投资的锁定效应,而采取机会主义行为将另一方套牢,攫取可占用专用性准租金。这种套牢风险不是单向的,而是双向的,双向套牢风险的存在不仅会降低军品科研生产项目建设质量,而且还会严重挫伤民营企业承担军品科研生产任务的积极性。为有效防范双向套牢风险,本文将从博弈论的角度,建立民营企业与军队采办部门的期望收益与专用性资产投资的函数关系和博弈矩阵,分阶段讨论民营企业与军队采办部门所面临的套牢风险大小及各自的最佳行为选择。以降低民企参军面临的套牢风险,引导更多优势民营企业进入军品科研生产与维修领域,推动军民融合的深度发展。     

Short‐term capacity allocation problem with tool and setup constraints

We consider a short‐term capacity allocation problem with tool and setup constraints that arises in the context of operational planning in a semiconductor wafer fabrication facility. The problem is that of allocating the available capacity of parallel nonidentical machines to available work‐in‐process (WIP) inventory of operations. Each machine can process a subset of the operations and a tool setup is required on a machine to change processing from one operation to another. Both the number of tools available for an operation and the number of setups that can be performed on a machine during a specified time horizon are limited. We formulate this problem as a degree‐constrained network flow problem on a bipartite graph, show that the problem is NP‐hard, and propose constant factor approximation algorithms. We also develop constructive heuristics and a greedy randomized adaptive search procedure for the problem. Our computational experiments demonstrate that our solution procedures solve the problem efficiently, rendering the use of our algorithms in real environment feasible. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Defence industries adjusting to change 1

This paper analyses the impact of terrorist activity on international tourist flows. To this end, we have estimated a cross‐sectional gravity equation for tourism from the G‐7 countries to a sample of 134 destinations over the period 2001–2003. Within this framework, we evaluate the deviation from ‘normal’ tourist flows due to terrorist activity, which is considered as negative advertising for the affected country. The analysis suggests that both domestic victims and international attacks are relevant factors when foreign tourists make their choice. This result is robust under alternative specifications. Moreover, the impact of terrorism is more severe in developing countries.     

The effect of catastrophes on the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems

We consider the single server Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. During the repair time new arrivals are allowed to join the system. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward‐cost structure with two types of rewards: A (usual) service reward for those customers that receive service and a (compensation) failure reward for those customers that are forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe. We study the strategic behavior of the customers regarding balking and derive the corresponding (Nash) equilibrium strategies for the observable and unobservable cases. We show that both types of strategic behavior may be optimal: to avoid the crowd or to follow it. The crucial factor that determines the type of customer behavior is the relative value of the service reward to the failure compensation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

The building evacuation problem with shared information

In this article, the Building Evacuation Problem with Shared Information (BEPSI) is formulated as a mixed integer linear program, where the objective is to determine the set of routes along which to send evacuees (supply) from multiple locations throughout a building (sources) to the exits (sinks) such that the total time until all evacuees reach the exits is minimized. The formulation explicitly incorporates the constraints of shared information in providing online instructions to evacuees, ensuring that evacuees departing from an intermediate or source location at a mutual point in time receive common instructions. Arc travel time and capacity, as well as supply at the nodes, are permitted to vary with time and capacity is assumed to be recaptured over time. The BEPSI is shown to be NP‐hard. An exact technique based on Benders decomposition is proposed for its solution. Computational results from numerical experiments on a real‐world network representing a four‐story building are given. Results of experiments employing Benders cuts generated in solving a given problem instance as initial cuts in addressing an updated problem instance are also provided. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008