Institutional parameters that condition farmer–herder conflicts in Tivland of Benue State,Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This conceptual review examines institutional parameters that underpin farmer–herder conflicts in Tivland of Benue State, Nigeria. Anchored on the theory of New Institutionalism, it argues that tensions and conflicts between Tiv-farmers and the Fulani-herdsmen is occasioned largely by the disarticulation of the traditional institutional norms/rules of interaction by formal political institutions expressed in land use laws, West African sub-regional protocol, human rights provision of the Nigerian constitution and the Benue State law on anti-grazing. In these contrasting institutional forms, the formal political institution is prioritised by the state while farmers and herders are divided about the institutional basis of their coexistence. Farmers who host the herdsmen demonstrate preference for traditional norms of land ownership and control while the herdsmen incline towards new political/legal instruments which they interpret, purports to give them access to grazing lands and hence an alibi for rejecting institutions that contradict their claim to access spaces for pastoralism. Thus, persisting claims to the exercise of rights to freedom of movement and access to grazing land as opposed to claims to traditional rights of ownership and control of ancestral lands explain the origin and continuity of the farmer–herder conflicts in Benue state, Nigeria.     

Anarchy’s anatomy: Two-tiered security systems and Libya’s civil wars

ABSTRACT

No issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution – two-tiered security systems – is particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited.