U.S.–RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND THE CTBT

Post-Cold War “lab-to-lab” collaborations on unclassified scientific issues between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons laboratories set the stage for bilateral cooperation in materials control and other nuclear areas. They also became the major element in a cooperative process initiated by a Presidential Decision Directive to ensure Russia's compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. These collaborations have always been highly favored by leaders of the Russian nuclear weapons complex—the same leaders who oversee Russia's participation in various government-to-government programs. This article reviews these collaborations and examines the possibility that U.S. rebuffs of Russian proposals and the U.S. failure to keep promises of expanded collaboration could contribute to Russia's reluctance in major programs and even lead to a return to nuclear testing by Russia. The author argues that a renewed U.S. commitment to the process should be an immediate goal of the Obama administration and is an essential step in re-engaging Russia to solve the nuclear problems remaining from the Cold War. Steps for doing so are recommended.     

装备保障抽组力量物资装载模型

对装备保障抽组力量的物资装载问题进行了数学描述,建立了以实现全部物资尽量分散装载为目标,以同类物资集中装载、车辆承载物资总体积不超过车辆有效容积、车辆承载物资总重量不超过车辆标记载重量、物资必须装载且不被重复装载等为主要约束的数学模型,并进行了求解.最后通过实例解算验证了模型的有效性.     

Pakistan's Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?

Throughout the 1990s Pakistan sought to cultivate ‘strategic depth’ throughout Iran, Afghanistan and the newly emergent Central Asian Republics while seeking to restrict Indian influence in the region. Chastened by its past failures, Pakistan now embraces more modest regional goals. Despite the diminution in objectives, several factors augur failure including Pakistan's policies in Afghanistan, which diminish the likelihood of a stable Afghanistan, and Pakistan's inability to pacify the various insurgencies roiling both Baluchistan and the Pashtun areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as well as the Northwest Frontier Province.     

Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After

The pattern of civil–military interaction in India is informed by the notion that civilians should refrain from involvement in operational matters. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to the defeat against China in 1962. In its aftermath, the belief that the debacle occurred because of civilian interference took hold. Thereafter, politicians restricted themselves to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military. The Indian ‘victory’ in the subsequent war with Pakistan was seen as vindicating this arrangement. This essay argues that the conventional reading of the China crisis is at best misleading and at worst erroneous. Further, it contends that the subsequent war with Pakistan actually underscores the problems of civilian non-involvement in operational issues. The historical narrative underpinning the norm of civilian abstention is at the very least dubious.     

When Will Non-Democratic Actors Win a Moral Victory Following Highly Costly Military Defeats?

Following costly military defeats political elites usually attempt to persuade their publics that the battlefield outcome was not a shameful defeat but a ‘moral victory’. Yet, only sometimes their public accepts these claims. The paper tries to explain this variation in the domestic publics' perceptions in the cases of non-democratic entities. It is argued that the key variable that determines actors' success in claiming a moral victory is the existence of certain battlefield elements, or at least symbolic military acts/achievements of the defeated actor which can persuade his public that these battlefield elements existed. Propaganda efforts to misrepresent the battlefield facts can play only a secondary role and only under certain conditions.     

新型涂层固相微萃取-气相色谱分析检测VX

以溶胶凝胶和交联固化相结合的方法制备了杯[4]芳烃开链冠醚／羟基硅油（Calix[4]open chain ether／OH-TSO）复合涂层固相微萃取探头,采用固相微萃取与气相色谱联用的方法测定水和土壤中的VX．并对自制探头的萃取效率、热稳定性、抗溶剂冲洗能力、使用寿命,保质期以及探头制备重现性等性能进行了系统研究．     

Choosing the Right Sidekick: Economic Complements to US Military Grand Strategies

ABSTRACT

Scholars and practitioners of grand strategy agree that the use of military force should be supplemented by appropriate economic policies. However, strangely few accounts of economic complements to military grand strategies have been presented in recent discourse on US grand strategy. This paper takes a first step to fill this information gap. I first assess the role that could be played by economic measures under two types of grand strategies – one focusing on the balance of power and the other emphasising influence and order. Second, I introduce what I call ‘the influence-capability dilemma’ and discuss tradeoffs in adopting certain economic policies in order to help the US sustain pre-eminence in the international system. Third, I discuss how the US should address this dilemma of economic means in dealing with the rising China.     

On the contribution of defense innovation to China’s economic growth

As the most knowledge-intensive industrial sectors, China’s defense industries are developing very fast. The present paper will explore the contribution of China’s defense innovation to its economic growth. Cobb–Douglas production function, integrating defense and non-defense stock in knowledge, is applied during the course. In addition, an input–output analysis of defense equipment procurement was done. Positive effect of China’s defense innovation on economic growth has been revealed by comparing the results from the two methods. And some suggestions are made to strengthen the effect.     

求解整数规划问题的一个搜索方法

本文整数规划问题给出一种搜索方法,它类似于求解连续变量优化问题的迭代方法,从一个好的初始可行解出发,寻找一个搜索方向,沿着这个方向求出改进的可行解,然后又开始下一次迭代。此方法简单易行,可以求出问题的最优解或近似最优解,对于整数线性规划问题和整数非线性规划问题的求解都适用,并且容易推广到求解大规校整数线性规划问题。文中附有计算例子,说明方法是有效的。     

Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith

In light of present day calls for increased levels of cultural understanding on the part of Western forces engaged in conflict, this article assesses the utility of such knowledge in light of the British experience of the North-West Frontier of India 1901–1945. By using the British concept of the Political Officer as an example, it proposes that while cultural understanding is of genuine importance when operating in such a challenging environment, possession of it does not necessarily aid either the design or implementation of successful policy. As the British experience on the Frontier during this period illustrates, cultural awareness and understanding may be possessed in abundance, and the mechanisms for achieving such a state of understanding may be advanced, but traditional factors such as a cultural bias on the part of policy-makers, conservatism, underfunding, local resistance to unfamiliar concepts and a fractured civil-military relationship will dominate such awareness and overshadow the benefits that it may provide.