“Flectas non frangas”: revisiting early twenty-first century UK–US defense relations (2000–2005) after five years

Adopting the analytical framework of the established interpretive “schools” of Anglo-American relations, this article offers several reflections on UK–US defense relations as they occurred over the significant years of 2000–2005. During those years, trajectories were established on which UK–US defense relations continue to travel today and outcomes emerged which are still being navigated. This article concludes that the Latin phrase, “Flectas Non Frangas” (essentially translated as: “Bend not Break”), is the most appropriate to adopt to characterize the developments undergone in recent UK–US defense relations. Many historical and strategic lessons with contemporary relevance are drawn.     

基于模糊层次分析法的战役情报效能评估

战役情报是组织实施战役所需的军事情报,运用模糊层次分析法对战役情报的效能进行评估,可以对军队情报工作产生一定程度的导向作用,进而促使增强情报工作的针对性,优化情报工作流程和资源配置。模糊层次分析法具有较高的科学性和客观性,计算方法简单、使用方便,通过应用实例表明模糊层次分析法对于衡量某特定情报集在战役中的支持力度具有一定的参考价值。     

Shifting power,preventive logic,and the response of the target: Germany,Russia, and the First World War

If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power.     

C3I配合下炮兵间瞄对抗及取胜概率仿真模拟

研究了在各自 C3 I情报系统的配合下 ,红蓝双方炮火间瞄对抗过程的计算机仿真模拟 ,建立了仿真模拟模型 ,给出了作战持续时间 ,双方的取胜概率 ,作战结束时双方的剩余兵力等重要作战数据的仿真模拟算法。通过改变作战系统的初始值 ,可以获得理想的刻画作战系统重要特征的作战数据 ,这在兵力部署与作战运筹中具有十分重要的意义。     

自适应数据融合算法

以防空导弹指控系统作战单位为背景,通过对现有经典算法及工程化算法的分析,结合专家经验,提出了基于算法间联系的工程化自适应数据融合算法.对自适应算法的思想、规则集、算法库、推理组成和算法的实现作了详细的描述.     

D-S证据论在空中目标分类中的应用

首先叙述识别、分类空中目标时需使用多传感器融合技术,分析可利用的各类传感器和从其可得到的各种目标属性参数,以及各种数据融合方法.然后详细介绍了基于D-S证据论的3种多源信息融合分类空中目标方法,并对具体仿真应用结果作了比较.     

Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security

Recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) suggest that this emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power, strategic competition, and world politics more broadly. After the initial surge of broad speculation in the literature related to AI this article provides some much needed specificity to the debate. It argues that left unchecked the uncertainties and vulnerabilities created by the rapid proliferation and diffusion of AI could become a major potential source of instability and great power strategic rivalry. The article identifies several AI-related innovations and technological developments that will likely have genuine consequences for military applications from a tactical battlefield perspective to the strategic level.     

陆军无人装备作战指挥信息系统

本文对陆战场无人化、智能化作战需求及其对指挥信息系统的能力要求进行分析。以美军为典型样例对无人装备的指挥信息系统发展现状进行分析,对无人装备作战指挥信息系统体系架构进行构想,并提出未来需重点突破的关键技术,最后对军队无人装备指挥信息体系的发展提出了几点建议。     

Israel’s Security Nexus as Strategic Restraint: The Case of Iran 2009–2013

This article examines the debates in Israel between 2009 and 2013 over Iran’s nuclear programme as a reflection of a particular type of civil–military or civil–security relationship. It analyses how key actors within that relationship – particularly those with an intelligence background – engaged with media outlets in Israel and further afield to influence domestic and international opinion over how best to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In so doing, it seeks to address one fundamental question: are governments in Jerusalem any longer the final arbiters over deciding what is in the national security interests of the State of Israel?     

Saddam versus the inspectors: the impact of regime security on the verification of Iraq’s WMD disarmament

The discovery that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2003 raised the question of why Saddam had prevented UN weapons inspectors from fully accounting for his disarmament. The leading explanation for Saddam’s behavior is that he valued ambiguity as part of a strategy of ‘deterrence by doubt’. This article argues that Iraq’s obstruction of inspectors in the late 1990s was motivated by his desire to shield Iraq’s regime security apparatus from UNSCOM’s intrusive counter-concealment inspections. The failure to understand how strongly Saddam’s concerns about his personal safety drove Iraq’s contentious relationship with UNSCOM set the stage for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.