Super-Weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War

This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. It argues that the LCS faced significant challenges in implementing its deceptions. Repeating the great strategic successes of the Second World War was extremely difficult; what remained for the Cold War were more limited deceptions.     

基于混合策略的文图自动转换方法研究

针对文图自动转换问题,借鉴事件模型的思想,结合自然语言理解和本体技术,提出了基于混合策略的文图自动转换方法。通过构建领域本体等知识库,在其支持下对文书进行预处理,以及词法、语法、语义和语用分析,最终实现了文图的自动转换。为验证方法的可行性,设计并实现了文图自动转换原型系统,测试表明,能有效提高文图自动转换的效率和准确性,具有一定的参考价值。     

The UK,interrogation and Iraq, 2003–2008

The UK’s interrogation operations during the conflict in Iraq (2003–2008) are often portrayed by the media as involving significant amounts of mistreatment. This article demonstrates that these practices are not necessarily representative of the UK’s interrogation operations across this conflict. In doing so it contributes to the limited literature on the practice of interrogation and on the UK’s combat operations in Iraq. The UK’s interrogation capability, and therefore its intelligence-gathering capability, is shown to have rested primarily with the military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT). The JFIT suffered from limitations to the number, training and experience of its interrogators and interpreters. It is argued that maintaining a permanent, higher level of preparedness for interrogation by the British armed forces is desirable.     

新型舰炮武器情报指挥系统模拟试验方法

在简要介绍模拟试验系统及搜索雷达模拟器功能和工作原理的基础上,针对某型近程反导舰炮武器情报指挥系统,提出了包括模拟试验流程、仿真数学模型及评估方法的一套模拟试验方法,弥补了单一外场试验考核不充分的不足,达到了全面科学评价被试系统的目的。该模拟方法是外场试验的补充和完善,开拓了靶场试验的新思路。     

The art of meddling: a theoretical,strategic and historical analysis of non-official covers for clandestine Humint

The building of reliable covers has always been of the utmost importance for clandestine Humint. Using both primary and secondary sources, this study seeks to examine how classical authors and modern scholars have dealt with this topic, and which kind of covers have been the most used throughout history in different sociopolitical contexts, and what are the new perspectives for today’s challenges. Findings suggest that a careful reading of the political milieu in which intelligence officers are required to work, and a certain degree of creativity, are the essential premises for the construction of a plausible cover; that some apparently outdated disguises such as merchants, itinerant monks and philosophers should be understood more broadly today to include business people, humanitarian NGOs and academics; that undercover practices have been theoretically and historically recognized as necessary and convenient by a great number of societies, often with scant regard for ethical considerations.     

Germany’s Answer to Standard Oil: The Continental Oil Company and Nazi Grand Strategy, 1940–1942

German grand strategy during World War II included making Europe independent of oil imported from sources controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. The first step was to wrest control of oilfields. Producing and distributing the oil, however, required the creation of a company capable of replacing the evicted British, American, and Soviet suppliers. Therefore, in 1941, the Third Reich established the Continental Oil Company. Analysis of the company’s foundation and operations sheds light on the objectives of the Third Reich, including the postwar economic development of Axis Europe and the extension of German hegemony beyond the USSR into the Middle East.     

Atomic intelligence in Norway during the Cold War

Thanks to its geographical location and close military ties to the US and Britain, Norway took substantial part in the Western intelligence effort against the Soviet nuclear weapons programme during the Cold War. Norway's relative proximity to the nuclear weapons test sites on Novaya Zemlya and the nuclear submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula was of particular importance in this regard. Whereas the tasks of surveying the development, deployment and possible employment of Soviet nuclear forces always had first priority, Western atomic intelligence conducted from Norwegian soil and waters was occasionally aimed even at gathering information about the geophysical and possible long-term medical and environmental implications of high-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

自主武器的特点及对未来战争影响 ——《无人军队：自主武器与未来战争》述评

以自主武器为代表的人工智能正在掀起一场新的军事革命。保罗·沙瑞尔所著的《无人军队：自主武器与未来战争》一书通过技术概念解释、各路专家访谈与大量战场实例,深入浅出地探讨了自主武器的内涵、特点与影响。本文基于该书内容,结合相关文献、书籍、评论等资料,首先对自主武器与无人军队的内涵、现阶段的运用情况进行简要介绍;其次,通过对自主武器技术内核的分析,简要介绍自主武器在各类战争样式的运用、存在的反为敌方利用的可欺骗性风险和故障发生后产生更严重后果的不稳定性风险;最后从三方面总结自主武器对战争其他方面的影响,即对军队建设模式提出更高要求,对国际战略稳定的双重作用以及对战争法与战争伦理道德的挑战。     

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)?????? since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.