变结构C3I系统指控组织结构的建模与评估

指挥控制组织是Ｃ３Ｉ系统的核心,文章讨论了指控组织的Ｐｅｔｒｉ网建模方法,提出了一种变结构的指控结构模型,并与以往所采用的固定结构的模型相比较对其进行了性能评估     

1,4 -二乙炔苯与1,4-丁炔二醇的共聚及表征研究

本文以(Ph_3P)_2 PdCl_2为催化剂,用各种比例的对二乙炔苯(DEB)与1,4-丁炔二醇(BD)合成出共聚物及两种单体的均聚物。共聚物为褐黑色,不溶不熔。单体配比中DEB比例越高,共聚物交联度和比重越大,产率越高,溶胀度越小。单体摩尔比DEB/BD≥1/2时,共聚物最良溶剂为苯,溶度参数(δP)为9.15卡~(0.5)·cm~(-1.5),而DEB/BD=1/5时,共聚物最良溶剂为无水乙醇,8p=12.7卡~(0.5)·cm~(-1.5).对均聚物及共聚物做了红外光谱表征并讨论了聚合反应机理。     

水压场信息处理系统

介绍了以３８６型微机为核心,由微压差传感器、传感器平衡及实时标定装置、直流放大器、Ａ／Ｄ转换器、站位控制电路构成的实验室用模型水压场信息处理系统．     

利用区间着色 Petri 网的 C~3I 系统时延分析

Ｃ３Ｉ系统是一个复杂的分布式离散事件动态系统,适合于用Ｐｅｔｒｉ网来描述其异步,并发行的,而且Ｃ３Ｉ系统是一个时间准则系统,文中提出的区间着色Ｐｅｔｒｉ网非常适合于分析其严格时限,并给出计算时延上（下）界的算法。     

防空 C~3I 时分多址网络仿真系统

介绍了防空Ｃ３Ｉ时分多址网络仿真系统的结构、功能、原理和特点。     

系统的互操作性

阐明了确保互操作性的重要性,介绍了有关互操作性的标准及互操作性的鉴别与测试,并提出了确保互操作性的几点建议。     

野战防空C~3I与防空兵作战指挥控制

陆军防空兵自动化指挥系统已作为防空作战效能“倍增器”列入国家军装武器发展规划,并在近期可能交付防空部队使用。这一新装备、新技术的出现和发展必然会引起防空作战指挥的变化。在分析防空兵指挥自动化对防空作战指挥影响的基础上,对如何发挥防空兵自动化指挥的防空作战效能和防空兵指挥自动化需迫切解决的一些问题加以探讨。     

单片机控制的指挥仪航路产生系统

本文首先介绍单片机控制的指挥仪航路产生系统的原理及组成,重点讨论了目标现在点坐标由数字量到指挥仪所需要的模拟信号的转换方法,最后对该系统的误差结果进行了分析。     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three‐way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep‐seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.