The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

“GOOD COP/BAD COP” AS A MODEL FOR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Scholarly and popular literature in the recent past has framed nonproliferation diplomacy toward both Iran and North Korea as an example of “good cop/bad cop,” a social-psychological strategy borrowed from law enforcement to describe a process for forcing a confession by subjecting a target to stressful emotional contrast. This article examines those two cases, roughly covering the period since 2003, when the most recent attempts to deal with the Iranian and North Korean proliferation threats began, in light of criteria for employment of the good cop/bad cop strategy. There is some evidence that within the framework of the six-party talks with North Korea and within the framework of the EU-3-U.S. diplomacy toward Iran, the players seeking nonproliferation have adopted good cop/bad cop roles to that end. The article concludes, however, that while there are similarities to the interrogation room technique, the complexity of the international political environment as compared to the interrogation room has prevented the states involved from successfully adopting or effectively exploiting good and bad cop roles. Substantial and exploitable differences of interest among them, and the availability of alternative “escape routes” for the target state, raise serious questions about the applicability of the good cop/bad cop strategy to these two nonproliferation cases, and even about its applicability in future nonproliferation challenges.     

Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three‐way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep‐seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.     

Saudi Arabia's defence offset programmes: Progress,policy and performance

This paper discusses the performance of Saudi Arabia's defence offset programmes. The Kingdom is involved in some of the World's biggest defence offset agreements and a review of the problems it has faced and the policies it has introduced provides a useful insight into that part of the international defence market where trade and development meet.

The paper reviews the origins and development of Saudi Arabia's major defence offset programmes. Saudi policies towards defence offsets are outlined before assessing the practical impact of the programmes themselves. The author concludes that Saudi Arabia's offset projects have had only a minor impact on the Kingdom's economy to date and makes a number of policy recommendations which are designed to enhance the utility of the programmes in the Kingdom's drive to enhance and diversify the technological base of its economy.     

Defence Enterprise Surveys On Market Outlets: The Case Of Slovenia

This article presents the results of an empirical survey of Slovenian defence enterprises focusing on three segmented geographic market outlets: the domestic market, the other European Union (EU-26) markets and the global markets. In the enterprise surveys are included around two-thirds of the domestic defence enterprises of different sizes and activities. The Slovenian defence enterprises by production, supply-in-return, subcontracting, middleman and trader activities in the defence marketing chains are mostly specializing towards the businesses on the domestic market. Rare enterprises are specialized exclusively for activities on the EU-26 markets and the global markets.     

钨球破片对相控阵雷达天线的冲击损伤仿真

利用非线性动力分析软件LS-DYNA 3D,建立了钨球破片在击穿相控阵雷达天线部件下的毁伤仿真模型.对不同初速度的钨球破片以45°入射角对天线等效靶板的侵彻进行仿真分析,得到了钨球破片整个侵彻作用全过程的完整图像和主要数据.通过对结果图像与数据的分析得出:随着钨球破片初速度增大,剩余速度也会随之增大、击穿靶板所需杀伤动能变大、靶板质量损失变大.结论为相控阵雷达天线的战损快速评估与平时修理提供了科学的依据和参考.     

基于TCP/IP协议的无人机IFFC系统仿真

为了提高无人机自主飞行、自主攻击的能力,设计一种整体式的无人机综合火力/飞行控制系统(IFFC系统),并对激光制导炸弹模态下的系统进行数字仿真.系统基于Winsock的TCP/IP协议的C/S模式,在服务器上完成无人机火控解算、火飞耦合器设计,在客户端设计基于PID算法的飞行控制模块.火控系统根据飞行状态和目标信息实时计算炸弹可达区域,瞄准距离误差经过火飞耦合器形成航向和俯仰控制命令反馈给飞控系统,驱动载机消.除瞄准误差,实现闭环控制.实验结果表明,无人机的瞄准速度和攻击精度都有所提高,为进一步开展自主式UAV的研究打下基础.     

面向时空交通栅格流量预测的3D通道注意力网络

城市交通流量预测对交通管理和公共安全具有重要意义。然而,交通栅格流量数据中的规律在时刻变化,在城市中存在全局范围的时空间关系,并且不同特征通道在每个城市区域上有不同的重要性。为解决这些挑战并做出更准确的预测,设计了一种新颖的时空神经网络模型——3D通道注意力网络(three-dimensional channel-wise attention networks,3D-CANet)。提出一个3D通道内注意力(three-dimensional inner channel attention,3D-InnerCA)单元来动态捕获各个通道中不同的全局时空相关性,同时设计通道间注意力(inter channel attention,InterCA)单元来自适应地重校准每个区域上不同特征通道的贡献。在3个真实交通栅格流量数据集上的实验结果表明,3D-CANet模型的预测能力优于其他对比方法,证明了模型的有效性。