排序方式: 共有131条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
针对多四旋翼编队飞行过程中对地面目标对峙跟踪、几何队形生成、稳固保持和协同抗干扰问题,设计了一种可应对外部环境干扰和气动参数不确定性的多四旋翼主从式协同目标跟踪方法。首先,建立存在外部干扰以及参数不确定性的四旋翼运动学/动力学模型;其次,基于Lyapunov导航向量场设计领航者的对峙跟踪航迹使得领航者以固定对峙半径实现对目标的盘旋跟踪;然后,构造多四旋翼分布式位置保持控制器,为后续姿态控制器构造提供必要的期望指令;最后,针对四旋翼外部环境干扰和气动参数不确定性设计基于自抗扰控制的多四旋翼姿态跟踪控制器。仿真结果表明所提方法可以在局部智能体通信的前提下实现对地面目标的对峙跟踪,显著改善四旋翼编队系统的抗干扰能力,提升干扰环境下多四旋翼编队几何构型的稳固性。 相似文献
62.
邹成亮 《武警工程学院学报》2010,(3):76-78
武警部队启动了新一轮教学改革,并下发了《武警院校教学改革实施方案》。武警院校在新一轮教学改革中要积极有为,必须首先解决好如何准确定位、区分对象和聚焦岗位的问题。为此,着重从科学定位、分层实施教学和拓宽创新领域等方面为推进武警院校教学改革提供基本的思路。 相似文献
63.
于高伟 《武警工程学院学报》2010,(5):26-27,31
革命歌曲具有催人奋进的独特精神力量,是革命军人战斗力的“力量倍增器”。在建设现代化武警过程中,革命歌曲可以发挥理想导引功能、信念塑造功能、团结凝聚功能、精神激励功能、情操陶冶功能。 相似文献
64.
对杨静教授《浅谈武警执勤用语的翻译——与(武警执勤实用英语)编者商榷》一文中行文规矩,以及提出《武警执勤实用英语》所举一些词语的翻译错误,提出了异议。杨文的商榷中,未指明商榷对象究竟来自哪本教材,且所列举有待商榷的译名和原文大多未注出处;杨文试图纠正问题,但读罢反令人更加迷惑;杨文认为“警卫对象”、“敌对分子”和“会客室”等词语翻译不恰当的说法,并不确当。 相似文献
65.
徐波 《武警工程学院学报》2011,(2):90-92
对武警院校开展野外拓展课程的现状进行了深入细致地调查研究,归纳总结了野外拓展的概念和理论。对野外拓展在武警院校教学中的功能作用进行了探讨分析,并将野外拓展课程的开设和学员综合素质的培养有机结合起来,从理论和实证的基础上剖析了野外拓展对提高学员综合素质的作用。 相似文献
66.
‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges. 相似文献
67.
在武警部队指挥体制和保障体制大调整大变革的背景下,立足当前武警部队后勤建设实际,为更好的贯彻落实习主席提出的后勤\"三大建设任务\"和\"聚焦保障打赢,加快转型重塑,努力建设强大的现代化后勤\"的指示要求,应着力完善后勤法规体系、后勤信息网络体系和后勤联合保障体系。 相似文献
68.
Ethan M. Orwin 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):330-351
From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict. 相似文献
69.
ABSTRACTThe practice of dispatching teams of police advisors to other states to build or train foreign security forces began at the end of the nineteenth century, yet there exists no definitive history of the practice, or any definitive theoretical approach underpinning why such missions succeed or fail. Drawing upon their recent edited book on expeditionary police advising, and by examining the donor or sending states, the host nations, and the use of police in counterinsurgency situations, the authors present some key reasons why such missions fail, and lay some groundwork for additional study of this important subject. 相似文献
70.
George Dimitriu 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):429-458
Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan. 相似文献