武警院校教育规模化、内涵式发展及其实现途径

将武警院校教育的发展方式作为研究的切入点,在分析过往武警院校教育发展方式所造成的诸如院校数量多、规模小、条块分割、结构不合理、办学效益不高等问题及其原因的基础上,提出了武警院校教育应走规模化、内涵式发展道路的思路,以及武警院校教育实现规模化、内涵式发展方式的具体途径和方法,并对此从理论与实践两个方面进行了论证。     

Force chains based mesoscale simulation on the dynamic response of Al-PTFE granular composites

Force chains based mesoscale simulation is conducted to investigate the response behavior of aluminum-polytetrafluoroethylene (Al-PTFE) granular composites under a low-velocity impact. A two-dimensional model followed the randomly normal distribution of real Al particles size is developed. The dynamic compressive process of Al-PTFE composites with varied Al mass fraction is simulated and validated against the experiments. The results indicate that, force chains behavior governed by the number and the size of agglomerated Al particles, significantly affects the impact response of the material. The failure mode of the material evolves from shear failure of matrix to debonding failure of particles with increasing density. A high crack area of the material is critical mechanism to arouse the initiation re-action. The damage maintained by force chains during large plastic strain builds up more local stresses concentration to enhance a possible reaction performance. In addition, simulation is performed with identical mass fraction but various Al size distribution to explore the effects of size centralization and dispersion on the mechanical properties of materials. It is found that smaller sized Al particle of com-posites are more preferred than its bulky material in ultimate strength. Increasing dispersed degree is facilitated to create stable force chains in samples with comparable particle number. The simulation studies provide further insights into the plastic deformation, failure mechanism, and possible energy release capacity for Al-PTFE composites, which is helpful for further design and application of reactive materials.     

在依法从严治校中加强院校正规化建设

依法从严治校,是体现现代教育思想和遵循军事教育规律的办学之道,是一种先进高效的管理模式。武警院校在调整改革中,必须始终坚持从严治警、依法从严治校,不断提高院校正规化建设水平。     

科技创新引领下的武警部队现代化装备建设发展思路与策略

推进武警部队现代化装备建设跨越发展,需要认清现状、更新观念、明确目标,确立没有科技创新就没有真正意义上的现代化装备建设的观念。武警装备科技创新,应在注重装备理论研究、加强非致命武器研发、拓展特种器材研制上实现新的突破和跨越;要在创新科技人才建设机制、完善装备科研管理机制、建立装备研发保障机制上增强科技创新能力,发挥科技创新引领的作用。     

Mimetic and normative isomorphism in the establishment and maintenance of independent air forces

Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.     

The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.     

Squad leaders today,village leaders tomorrow: Muslim auxiliaries and tactical politics in Algeria, 1956–1962

From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’sStrategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.     

‘God willing,I will be back’: Gauging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's capacity to deter economic crimes in Liberia

Recently, in July 2012, the high-profile and bitterly fought nine-month race for the post of Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission, between Dr Jean Ping of Gabon, and his main challenger, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, culminated in the latter's victory. Her victory came after the deadlock at the Eighteenth AU Summit in January 2012. Borne out of the considered need for a quick fix through reliance on a vote of expediency, the election of Dr Dlamini-Zuma represented a political resolution to the crisis that arose due to the earlier ongoing electoral deadlock. Far from being a competitive election by design, the 2012 AU Commission election by default became transformed into an intensely fought campaign that put the AU in the limelight. This article briefly introduces the electoral process, explains in detail the voting behaviour of AU member states, and offers five specific reasons for the victory of Dr Dlamini-Zuma. On the surface the election looks very competitive, but the article explains why this is not the case. To create greater competition for these posts, the AU needs to overhaul the nomination process and the voting procedure. In this regard, the article proffers detailed analysis and proposes a radical revision of the existing criteria for the nomination. The article also proposes specific recommendations for the amendment of the rules of procedure of the AU Assembly to allow for a qualified majority as a deadlock breaker in the fifth round. It also assesses whether the integrity of the AU Commission election was damaged during the campaigning and voting process. In this regard, it recommends the development of a code of conduct for future elections at the AU.