战术防空激光武器发展概况

空中攻击与防空作战在相互斗争中发展,随着空中威胁目标种类变化、性能提高,作为防空武器的一个重要的新型分支,防空激光武器在快速发展,将在近程防空与反导中起重要作用。综述了空中威胁变化对激光武器的需求,激光武器的分类、组成与特点,以及国外战术防空激光反导武器系统发展概况。     

基于系统关联分析的装备维修费用的灰色系统预测研究

利用系统分析的方法对影响装备维修费用的因素做了分析．使用灰色关联分析的方法讨论了影响装备维修费用的主要因素．通过灰色ＧＭ（１,１）建模,给出了装备维修费用的预测．     

舰船动力系统优化设计方法展望

简述了舰船动力系统优化设计的思想与内容,研究了舰船动力系统优化设计的理论与方法,提出了综合集成设计、智能优化设计等未来舰船动力系统优化设计的概念与方法     

潜艇 AIP 研究选型的系统分析

通过对几种潜艇ＡＩＰ的系统分析与评价,提出了潜艇ＡＩＰ研究选型的建议．     

层次分析法中一致性检验的一种调整方法

针对层次分析法中一致性检验难以通过的问题,提出了一种优化调整方法,并分析了该方法的基本思路及可行性。为方便上机编程,还给出了该方法的具体实现步骤。     

基于微分对策理论的信息战模型

基于兰彻斯特作战理论,提出了一个新的微分对策模型来研究在交战双方均有信息战系统协助作战的条件下的最优火力分配策略。又运用微分对策理论对该模型进行分析和求解,并对所得到的结论作出符合战术意义的解释。     

编队防空作战模型——目标威判与目标分配

根据编队的结构特点和决策特性,本文首先讨论了编队目标威胁判断的指标及其计算,进而建立了编队目标威胁度计算模型。接着,本文讨论了编队的目标分配问题,建立了两层的目标分配模型,它既考虑编队的整体利益,又顾及每舰具体情况,通过指挥员实现编队目标的满意分配。     

Lessons in airpower projection: Indochina and Algeria

The lessons from the two French counterinsurgencies, Indochina and Algeria, give rise to a new understanding of the projection of airpower in remote and hostile environments and the purpose, design, and use of aircraft in counterinsurgency. In both Indochina and Algeria, the campaigns were ones of poverty, and it is their imaginative management under severe resource constraints that provides thoughtful and applicable lessons for today. In both cases, airpower held the promise of delivering victory and solving the resource issue. In Indochina, acquisition of the needed aircraft, operating knowledge, and experience came too slowly to realize this promise. In Algeria, the French embraced the lessons from Indochina and were quite successful and innovative in the use of airpower. The lessons can be reduced to four requirements: (1) a network of airfields for liaison, ground-support, and intra-theater airlift to enable effective air support of ground forces; (2) a solid, reliable, and simple ground-support aircraft capable of operating from forward airfields within range of ground engagements; (3) a capable intra-theater heavy-lift transport to supply the extended ground forces; and (4) helicopter capability to enhance tactical troop mobility and support.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.