纳米科技与现代国防

阐述了纳米科学与技术当前的国内外发展趋势,并论述了其在现代国防军事技术方面的潜在应用.     

防空中存在两次转火射击时的火力分配模型

在对空防御时 ,进行火力分配不但要考虑到一次性分配的最佳方案 ,而且应该考虑是否在条件允许的情况下进行一次或两次转火射击 ,如果存在 ,怎样进行转火才能使其射击效果最好。把威胁判断和火力分配结合起来考虑 ,以我方的生存概率为指标 ,建立了存在两次转火射击的火力分配模型 ,并用实例计算检验了模型的正确性。     

海军舰载导弹防空系统信息作战方法

信息与火力是海军舰载导弹防空系统研究的核心问题,运用信息作战原理,在给定攻击战机的条件下,对舰载导弹防空系统的信息与火力联合作战能力的分析表明:与提高作战安全性的隐形战机相比,军事诱骗战术更易降低舰载导弹防空系统的火力防御能力.火力对作战能力的贡献约为信息的4倍.根据这一结论,可以为海军舰载导弹防空系统开发出基于信息作战原理的新战法,全面提高指战员在实战中把握信息与火力的运用规律、实施信息作战、做出科学决策和夺取战场胜利的能力.     

水面舰艇对鱼雷防御决策仿真分析

如何对来袭鱼雷进行防御成为水面舰艇对潜防御作战的重中之重.根据世界主要海军国家普遍装备的火箭助飞声诱饵的使用原理、基本战技性能,结合"线导+声自导"鱼雷的作战过程,仔细分析了水面舰艇对抗鱼雷的作战态势,通过大量的仿真计算得出火箭助飞声诱饵的最佳使用方式以及舰艇的机动方法.     

Think again – supplying war: reappraising military logistics and its centrality to strategy and war

This article argues that logistics constrains strategic opportunity while itself being heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning. With the academic literature all but ignoring the centrality of logistics to strategy and war, this article argues for a reappraisal of the critical role of military logistics, and posits that the study and conduct of war and strategy are incomplete at best or false at worst when they ignore this crucial component of the art of war. The article conceptualises the logistics–strategy nexus in a novel way, explores its contemporary manifestation in an age of uncertainty, and applies it to a detailed case study of UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.     

战术防空激光武器发展概况

空中攻击与防空作战在相互斗争中发展,随着空中威胁目标种类变化、性能提高,作为防空武器的一个重要的新型分支,防空激光武器在快速发展,将在近程防空与反导中起重要作用。综述了空中威胁变化对激光武器的需求,激光武器的分类、组成与特点,以及国外战术防空激光反导武器系统发展概况。     

Lessons in airpower projection: Indochina and Algeria

The lessons from the two French counterinsurgencies, Indochina and Algeria, give rise to a new understanding of the projection of airpower in remote and hostile environments and the purpose, design, and use of aircraft in counterinsurgency. In both Indochina and Algeria, the campaigns were ones of poverty, and it is their imaginative management under severe resource constraints that provides thoughtful and applicable lessons for today. In both cases, airpower held the promise of delivering victory and solving the resource issue. In Indochina, acquisition of the needed aircraft, operating knowledge, and experience came too slowly to realize this promise. In Algeria, the French embraced the lessons from Indochina and were quite successful and innovative in the use of airpower. The lessons can be reduced to four requirements: (1) a network of airfields for liaison, ground-support, and intra-theater airlift to enable effective air support of ground forces; (2) a solid, reliable, and simple ground-support aircraft capable of operating from forward airfields within range of ground engagements; (3) a capable intra-theater heavy-lift transport to supply the extended ground forces; and (4) helicopter capability to enhance tactical troop mobility and support.     

How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his ‘Maritime Strategy’ studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of ‘External Reinforcement of the Flanks’ of 1968 – finally followed by the ‘Brosio Study’ (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's ‘tactical northern flank’ was set to become an independent strategic theatre.     

SOCIAL PREFERENCES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE AND POLICE ENFORCEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

We study the determinants of social preferences for national defence and for police and law enforcement. For this task, we estimate a bivariate ordered probit model for a set of European countries (France, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) in 2006. Determinants of spending decisions for defence and police are found to be linked but are of significantly different magnitudes. Besides, measures against terrorist threats are positively linked to police and defence spending increases, while the subjective perception of fiscal pressure has no influence. Finally, no significant differences are found between Northern and Southern Europe.     

Allocating the U.S. Department of Defense Budget: Revisiting the ‘Incremental/Fair Share Model’

Abstract

This article examines the ‘incremental/fair share model’ that was proposed by Alex Mintz in 1988 concerning the budget allocation of the U.S. Department of Defense. Although Mintz was unable to confirm the correctness of his model, this study demonstrated it to be statistically significant. In the statistical analyses, I used the two-stage least squares method and Durbin’s h-test to better scrutinize the model’s adequacy. Few previous studies have addressed the allocation of the U.S. defence budget; consequently, the incremental/fair-share model should constitute a starting point for further research on the U.S. defence budget allocation.