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Walter Dorn 《Journal of Military Ethics》2017,16(3-4):272-285
Central to the mainstream Sikh identity is the concept of ethically-justified force, used as a last resort. There is no place for absolute pacifism in this conception of ethical living. Fighters and martyrs occupy an important place in the Khalsa narrative, and Sikhs are constantly reminded of the sacrifices and heroism of their co-religionists of the past. This article explores how the Sikh warrior identity is manifested in the contemporary world. It examines the Sikhs who, in the 1980s and 1990s, were involved on both sides of the Punjab crisis: those militants who fought for a Sikh homeland (“Khalistan”) and those Sikhs in the Indian army who suppressed the insurgency. The article also looks beyond the militants and soldiers to Sikhs employed in modern security-related professions, the broader issue of Sikh symbols relating to the use of force, and violence within the Sikh diaspora. An examination of the Sikhs in various parts of the world reveals additional uses and consequences of ideology, whether in enlistment in the armed forces of the states in which they live, or in the support of the militancy in India, particularly in the 1980s. The conclusion is that the modern Sikh warrior is a nuanced actor behaving in various ways, some overt and some subtle: the warrior is willing to physically fight those perceived to be tyrannous, but most initiatives have shifted to pursuing justice through non-violent means, such as legal struggles for civil rights. Although armed Sikh militancy against the Indian government is in the past, there are strong residual resentments still requiring redress. All of this is of great relevance to understanding the ethics of armed force within modern Sikhism. 相似文献
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Yoav Gortzak 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(1):137-160
Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns. 相似文献
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Alastair Finlan 《Defense & Security Analysis》2013,29(3):188-202
The death of Jean Charles de Menezes on the London Underground in 2005 remains a horrifying example of what happens when counterterrorism goes wrong. One of the extraordinary features of the shooting was the remarkable number of special elements, police units, military Special Forces, and unusual procedures and tactics involved in the incident. This article attempts to assess the causal significance of the special dimension in the horrific chain of circumstances. It does so by interrogating numerous explanations for the tragedy and highlighting the role of the special factor. The Stockwell shooting remains very important today because it casts a sharp and somewhat harsh spotlight on the particular pitfalls of special responses, measures and units to the multitudinous threats posed by international terrorism in the twenty-first century. 相似文献
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This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan. 相似文献
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Thijs Brocades Zaalberg 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):867-897
This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies. 相似文献
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B.K. GREENER-BARCHAM 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):90-112
Some scholars would have us believe that the distinctions between military and policing roles, methods and objectives have become increasingly blurred by the security demands of a post-Cold War and post-11 September global and domestic order. This article explores the current state of the police–military divide through a conceptual and case study analysis. It concludes that, in this case, there is some conflation occurring at a macro-level as international and domestic affairs have become increasingly indistinct, but the article also demonstrates that the actual ethos and practice of these agencies still differs strongly. Most importantly, the article argues that this distinction is in fact a very useful one in planning for future peace support operations 相似文献
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邹南 《武警工程学院学报》2011,(1):22-25
武警法究竞是否独立的部门法,是由来已久且必须回答的重要命题。《中华人民共和国人民武装警察法》的颁布为武警法的独立性提供了实证。武警法与相关法律部门,如军事法、行政法、警察法有本质的区别。武警法是我国法律体系中具有独立地位的部门法。 相似文献