Smart Power and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

Abstract

From Iraq to the Gulf of Aden and the South Pacific, this paper evaluates how far theoretical ideas about smart power manifest in operational missions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). To function within a ‘smart’ power context, this paper suggests that JSDF operates in ‘assisting’ mode, rather than the ‘threatening’ behavior of ‘hard’ power. JSDF also deployed alongside other Japanese ‘soft’ power tools – diplomatic, cultural, developmental, and NGOs, using tailored programs for different cultural and geographical contexts. Given constitutional constraints and public sensitivity towards coercive force, JSDF missions could be integrated more into a ‘whole-of-government’ approach advancing foreign policy goals through ‘smart power’.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

论武警法概念

为了推动武警法研究工作向更深、更广发展,对武警法、武警法学等基础性概念需要科学定义。从概念的历史沿革、两个概念的科学涵义展开讨论,得出武警法的概念应当从广义角度定义、武警法学有学科和学说两种指向的结论,进而阐述了武警法的概念定义。     

依据《人民武装警察法》加强武警部队履职能力建设

武警部队依法执行国家赋予的安全保卫任务时,通常政治敏感度高、事发紧急、政策法规性强、舆论关注力度大。针对以上特点,部队要严格依据《人民武装警察法》有关规定,忠实履行职责使命,不断提高把关定向能力、核心军事能力、依法办事能力和科学管理能力。     

Forces or Force及其他——与杨静教授《浅谈武警执勤用语的翻译》商榷

对杨静教授《浅谈武警执勤用语的翻译——与（武警执勤实用英语）编者商榷》一文中行文规矩,以及提出《武警执勤实用英语》所举一些词语的翻译错误,提出了异议。杨文的商榷中,未指明商榷对象究竟来自哪本教材,且所列举有待商榷的译名和原文大多未注出处;杨文试图纠正问题,但读罢反令人更加迷惑;杨文认为“警卫对象”、“敌对分子”和“会客室”等词语翻译不恰当的说法,并不确当。     

武警院校开设野外拓展课程探讨

对武警院校开展野外拓展课程的现状进行了深入细致地调查研究,归纳总结了野外拓展的概念和理论。对野外拓展在武警院校教学中的功能作用进行了探讨分析,并将野外拓展课程的开设和学员综合素质的培养有机结合起来,从理论和实证的基础上剖析了野外拓展对提高学员综合素质的作用。     

《人民武装警察法》“社会安全事件”概念及特点分析

《中华人民共和国人民武装警察法》颁布之前,武警部队虽然已经担负着执行处置社会安全事件的任务,但对于社会安全事件的概念及其特点的分析较为模糊。2009年8月颁布的《人民武装警察法》第2章第7条,明确将社会安全事件纳入武警部队的任务范围。鉴于武警部队执行任务种类的多样性,有必要对这一概念的内涵、外延及其特点进行界定。     

武警学院办学定位的理性分析

高校要持续、健康地发展,必须找准自身的位置。科学、准确、合理的定位对高校的办学行为起着规范、约束和自我评估的作用。结合武警学院办学实际,根据学院集国民高等教育的正规性、公安业务的特殊性、管理养成的军事性的特点,从影响办学定位的办学目标、类型、层次、学科、服务面向、特色六个方面,对武警学院办学定位鲜明的个性内容进行了理性分析。     

Does civil war hamper financial development?

We examine how armed conflict effects financial development in a cross-country setting using dynamic panel data analysis in a panel of 66 developing countries for the period 1985–2010. Financial development is measured by M2 as a share of GDP, and credit allocated to private sector by banks as a share of GDP. Our findings suggest that armed conflict has a significant adverse effect on financial development. Simultaneously, the quality of governance is always highly significant and conducive to the financial development. The quality of governance is more salient in determining financial development compared to low- and medium-intensity armed conflict; however, the quality of governance cannot entirely offset the adverse impact of high-intensity armed conflict on financial development.