潜艇规避被动声纳浮标阵方法及期望驶离时间

基于对反潜巡逻机布放被动声纳浮标阵的研究,对方形阵的布放建立了模型。利用该模型研究了我潜艇规避被动浮标声纳阵的方法。通过计算,得出潜艇驶离被动声纳浮标阵搜索范围的期望时间,用选取的声纳浮标阵间距和潜艇规避速度对结果进行分析,为潜艇的下一步行动提供辅助决策。     

The Zimbabwe people’s revolutionary army military operations in Makonde district and the attack on Salisbury’s fuel storage tanks, 1965-1979

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army operations in Mashonaland West province with particular reference to Makonde District during the country’s war of liberation. Despite the growing literature on ZAPU and ZPRA in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation there is little that has been written concerning the operations of ZPRA guerrillas in Mashonaland provinces. Guided by evidence drawn from secondary and primary sources the article further asserts that ZPRA adopted a four pronged strategy in Makonde District. This strategy in part was hinged on the politicization of the population on the one hand and annihilation of the enemy forces, attrition and manoeuvre warfare on the other. Again, the article argues that ZPRA guerrillas attempted to capture Salisbury (Harare) in order to conquer the Rhodesian Security Forces’ centre of gravity. It was hoped that the capture of the capital city would Makoni District was of strategic significance to the conduct of ZPRA operations and arguably hastened Ian Smith’s decision to attend the Lancaster House Conference negotiations that led to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.     

Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962

While the importance of indigenous forces for successful counterinsurgency operations has long been recognized by great powers fighting local insurgencies, the factors that determine the performance of such forces have attracted relatively little scholarly attention. This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of those determinants through an examination of the role and performance of auxiliary indigenous units in French counterinsurgency operations during the Algerian War (1954–62). The findings presented here suggest some important lessons for those seeking to recruit and deploy effective indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations.     

The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.     

基于几何关系的视线指令制导律研究

针对近程车载防空系统拦截空地导弹的制导问题,设计了一种视线指令制导律.首先建立了地面站、拦截弹和空地导弹三者之间相对运动模型,然后以控制拦截弹位于地面站和空地导弹连线上为目标,根据三者在空间的几何关系设计了一种视线指令制导律,并对拦截的可行性进行了分析.仿真结果验证了所设计的制导律能够有效保证地面站的安全,与比例导引律相比,提高了制导精度,缩短了拦截时间.     

空舰导弹火控系统精度分析研究

介绍了一种空舰导弹火控系统动态精度试验的试验方法、误差分析理论和方法.用导弹火控系统的数据测量设备获取火控系统输出射击诸元参数实际值,再测量载机和靶船的位置和运动参数,经真值解算模型解算出射击诸元参数标准值.将实际值与标准值进行比较与分析,即可得知空舰导弹火控系统的动态精度是否满足要求.此方法已成功地应用于导弹火控系统精度飞行试验中.     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective

European defence policy has been dominated by politics. This paper shows how economic principles can be used to derive guidelines for the formulation of European defence policy. The inefficiencies of the EU's existing defence arrangements are identified. It is shown that there is scope for efficiency improvements in the EU's Armed Forces and its defence industries.     

GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY

When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of “Global INF” and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.