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Christopher Davis 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(3):145-177
The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia. 相似文献
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软件质量保证技术研究综述 总被引：9，自引：0，他引：9
贲可荣 《海军工程大学学报》2002,14(4):1-6
概述了软件可靠性研究的必要性 ,从软件开发过程管理、质量保证标准、测试技术、可靠性评估与预测以及形式化规范和验证等 5个方面给出了软件质量问题的解决办法 ,并对所研究的成果做了介绍 .最后指出了在统计测试、形式化方法方面有待进一步研究的问题 相似文献
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朱烨昕 《武警工程学院学报》2011,(3):56-59
警营文化工作是部队精神文明和政治工作的重要内容,也是提高部队凝聚力和战斗力的强大“助推器”。本文分析了当前部队基层文化工作中存在的“四多四少”现象,并就如何着眼问题、解决矛盾,推进警营文化建设健康有序地发展提出了思考。 相似文献
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针对靶场进行导弹武器系统制导精度评定试验样本少的问题,提出了一种通过仿真提高试验结果评估置信度的数据融合评估方法。对舰空导弹武器系统制导误差产生的原因、误差分布规律进行了分析,给出了基于Bootstrap的制导精度评定方法。 相似文献
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常新 《武警工程学院学报》2014,(5):58-61
针对学科建设在院校发展、人才培养中的重要作用,结合武警院校学科建设实际,探讨了如何以强军目标为牵引,把握武警院校学科建设着力点应关注的问题。强军目标指向清晰,决定人才培养目的,必须突出学科发展重点;强军目标内容完整,提出人才培养要求,必须优化学科体系架构;强军目标任务繁重,需要人才培养支撑,必须加大学科建设力度。 相似文献
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无人机在完成自主飞行任务的倾斜转弯过程中,其横侧向运动具有强耦合性,且受到各种各样未知扰动源的干扰影响.为改善无人机的横侧向控制性能,给出了一种横侧向的自抗扰飞行控制律设计方法.首先,分析了转弯飞行过程中的横侧向耦合特性;其次,利用自抗扰控制技术设计横侧向的解耦控制律,并基于遗传算法进行控制参数的优化;最后根据系统干扰... 相似文献
310.
Ulrich Kühn 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(1-2):155-166
The end of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has the potential to plunge Europe and NATO into deep crisis. Russia’s continued violation coupled with the Donald J. Trump administration’s desire to balance against Moscow and Beijing could force a new missile debate on Europeans. Even though Washington is trying to assuage its allies, the specter of another round of INF missile deployments to Europe is not unrealistic. Meanwhile, NATO’s European members face a dilemma. Some want NATO to resolutely push back against Russia. Others want to avoid a new deployment debate, at almost all costs. The Kremlin will use these cleavages to weaken NATO. If not carefully handled, NATO’s response to the Russian missile buildup could lead to domestic turmoil in a number of European states and render the alliance ineffective for a prolonged period. Europeans need to act now and voice their preferences in the military and diplomatic domains. A number of different military options are available, below the level of deploying new INF missiles in Europe. However, Europeans need to consider trade-offs regarding crisis and arms-race stability. At the same time, it will be up to European capitals to conceptualize a new arms-control framework for the post-INF world, one that takes into account today’s geopolitical realities and the entanglement of modern conventional and nuclear forces. Given the Trump administration’s loathing of arms control, concepts of mutual restraint may well have to wait for the next US administration. In any case, that should not stop Europeans from taking on more responsibility for their own security. 相似文献