One Step Forward,Two Steps Back

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea

This study analyses an arms race between South and North Korea over the period 1963–2000. Despite the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the arms race between South and North Korea has rarely been studied. In this study, the South–North arms race is empirically estimated using Richardson’s action–reaction model. The pattern of South–North arms race between the Cold War (1963–1989) and the post‐Cold War eras (1990–2000) as well as the existence of an arms race is examined comparing both countries’ defence spending, number of military personnel and tactical aircraft.     

DETERMINING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

This paper models the determination of the defence industrial base – the number of different military systems a country decides to maintain. High R&D costs means that few countries can afford to produce major weapons systems and the producers also import systems. Non‐producers rely on imports and we assume their demand is driven by regional arms races. Military capability is determined by the number of systems and the quantity and quality of each. We examine how the defence industrial base is influenced by military expenditures, R&D costs, export controls, the nature of regional arms races and a variety of other factors.     

An analysis of the Washington naval agreements and the economic provisions of arms control theory

During the Cold War, two contending hypotheses dominated theories concerning the economic impact of anus control. The first suggested that when certain prerequisites were fulfilled, arms control agreements served to promote lasting reduction in military spending. The second asserted that instead of promoting savings, arms control encouraged diversion of resources to more advanced and expensive weapons, thus driving defense spending higher. Through the examination of the impact of the Washington Naval Agreements on naval expenditure during the 1920s, this paper provides empirical evidence to support the latter of these competing hypotheses. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan all realized economic savings after signing the Washington Naval Agreements. However, these savings soon eroded as the powers developed more advanced weapons‐systems.     

Export controls,market structure and international coordination

We look at the different ways of aggregating the exports of dual use products to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security, market structure and competition between exporting firms in determining the existence of multiple equilibria and therefore, the need for coordination between countries in setting export controls.     

Budget allocation under uncertainty and the costs of war and insecurity

This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country’s wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli–Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel’s gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria’s perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel’s perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria’s regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s welfare will be moderate.     

Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

The impact of superpower arms transfers on conflict in the Middle East

I explore the relationship between superpower arms transfers and the Arab‐Israeli rivalry. My empirical analysis suggests that Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East, more than American transfers, have exacerbated interstate rivalry in the region. It also suggests that Soviet arms transfers, again more than American transfers, have encouraged compensatory arming by the other superpower. These conclusions derive from the results of cross‐correlation analysis, Granger‐causality tests, and variance decompositions, and are quite robust. While my findings paint a rather unflattering portrait of the effects of superpower involvement in the region, they do constitute grounds for optimism in light of current developments.