One Step Forward,Two Steps Back

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.     

Statistical Analysis as an Adjunct to Historical Research: Identification of the Likely Manufacturers of British Pattern 1907 Bayonets Supplied by the Birmingham Small Arms Company to the Siamese Government in 1920

In 1920, the Birmingham Small Arms Company supplied 10,000 Pattern 1907 bayonets to the government of Siam to accompany an order for rifles. The original maker of these bayonets was unknown, but historical research indicates that the Wilkinson Sword Co. Ltd. was a primary maker. The weights of some surviving Pattern 1907 bayonets, including twelve bayonets from the 10,000 described above, produced by the six makers in the UK before and during the Great War (1914–1918) period were available. A statistical analysis of the data was performed to compare with the historical research. The results strongly supported that the Wilkinson Sword Co. Ltd. was a primary maker. They were also sufficient to exclude from this batch of twelve bayonets the Royal Small Arms Factory (Enfield) and Vickers Ltd. as manufacturers. The statistical evidence for the presence of bayonets made by J.A. Chapman Ltd., R. Mole & Sons and Sanderson Bros. was weaker than that for the Wilkinson Sword Co. Ltd., but was nevertheless supportive of that hypothesis. Overall, the analysis was consistent with the supply to Siam of commingled bayonets from British government stores. It was noted that the bayonets for the Siam contract fell into a relatively narrow weight range, but the reason for this could not be determined.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

An alliance between Cyprus and Greece: assessing its partners’ relative security contribution

The issue that this paper tackles is the assessment of the relative security benefits that Cyprus and Greece derive in the context of their cooperation on defence matters. This form of cooperation, known as the ‘Integrated Defence Space Doctrine’, aims at defending their interests in the Aegean Sea and the broader East Mediterranean theatre. The paper relies heavily on earlier research on this topic, which deals with the Greek–Cypriot alliance facing an arms race against Turkey, and uses a coefficient especially designed to assess the optimal levels of security and the associated defence expenditure of the two allies. A comparison of the relative security coefficient values for the two allies suggests that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. Given the importance assigned to human resources by this index, in conjunction with the demographic problems of Greece, this conclusion justifies the recent Greek defence policy revision, emphasizing quality, capital equipment and flexibility of forces. This revision aims at satisfying the security requirements of the alliance and the increasing demands of an arms race against Turkey.     

FINANCIAL VERSUS HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE GREEK–TURKISH ARMS RACE 10 YEARS ON: A FORECASTING INVESTIGATION USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

This paper looks into the Greek–Turkish arms race a decade after an earlier contribution to the issue that relied heavily on artificial neural networks. The time period between the two papers contributes to the reliability of the results derived, not just by increasing the number of observations, but also mainly by incorporating the progress made in the realm of artificial intelligence. The focus on the case of both countries unlike the paper mentioned above that dealt with just the Greek side provides ample room for comparative purposes regarding the determinants of defense expenditure on both sides. The results derived in terms of input significance estimation support the findings of the earlier research as indicated above, pointing to the leading role of the demographic preponderance of Turkey over Greece. The paper also points to the fact that 10 years later, Turkey continues to set the arms race rules against its rival by determining the defense expenditure of Greece, whereas the role of the latter in affecting the military spending of Turkey is non‐existent.