Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

One Step Forward,Two Steps Back

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.     

The financing factor in military trade

Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense.     

应用小扰动分析方法进行舰船排水量/费用影响研究

采用一种“小扰动分析方法”研究了由于设计参数的改变而引起排水量及相关费用变化的过程,即“舰船排水量／费用影响研究”．在分析方法原理的基础上,以动力装置为例具体演示了分析过程,并结合实例说明了该方法在现代舰船设计权衡中的应用．     

A PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE IN SPAIN

This study analyses the performance of the productivity of the main industrial subsectors composing the security and defence technological and industrial base (SDTIB) in Spain from 1996 to 2009. Accordingly, we have used the non-parametric data envelopment analysis and bootstrapping techniques to compute Malmquist productivity indexes that allow us to split productivity growth into efficiency change and technical progress. The results obtained show productivity improvement in the SDTIB as a whole due mainly to advances in technology and to a lesser extent to the contribution of technical efficiency. The bootstrap approach yields further evidence, as for many cases, productivity growth or decline, is not statistically significant. This is the first time a study of this kind has been carried out on the production process of this sector in Spain.     

Market reactions to regulations on minerals from the democratic republic of the Congo

Using an event study approach to analyze stock market data from the United States, I investigate how regulations on conflict minerals sourced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were perceived by investors. I find that for a subset of mining companies, stock returns were abnormally high when regulations in the US became more likely. I also find that returns were higher for communications equipment manufacturing companies when strong regulations in the DRC were announced. I argue that these responses were due to the competitive environments faced by each of these company types. These findings relate to debates surrounding the effects of the conflict mineral regulations. While some critics argue that reporting requirements were tantamount to a ban on minerals from the DRC, I find that stock returns for a subset of companies were sensitive to legislation in the DRC after legislation became law in the US, suggesting that market participants did not expect a complete trade ban on regulated mining and trading activities.     

An analysis of the Washington naval agreements and the economic provisions of arms control theory

During the Cold War, two contending hypotheses dominated theories concerning the economic impact of anus control. The first suggested that when certain prerequisites were fulfilled, arms control agreements served to promote lasting reduction in military spending. The second asserted that instead of promoting savings, arms control encouraged diversion of resources to more advanced and expensive weapons, thus driving defense spending higher. Through the examination of the impact of the Washington Naval Agreements on naval expenditure during the 1920s, this paper provides empirical evidence to support the latter of these competing hypotheses. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan all realized economic savings after signing the Washington Naval Agreements. However, these savings soon eroded as the powers developed more advanced weapons‐systems.     

The benefits and costs of the UK arms trade

A benefit‐cost framework and the associated evidence is used to evaluate UK arms exports. Two issues are examined in detail. First, trade externalities; and second, a case study of the problems and costs of maintaining the UK submarine industrial base without exports.     

Export controls,market structure and international coordination

We look at the different ways of aggregating the exports of dual use products to give the security perception of exporter countries and their consistency with the relevant export control regimes. Also, we analyze different models of export controls highlighting the role of the perception of security, market structure and competition between exporting firms in determining the existence of multiple equilibria and therefore, the need for coordination between countries in setting export controls.     

The disconnect between arms control and DDR in peace processes

The article discusses the disconnect between arms control and disarmament practices vis-à-vis peacebuilding practices. It critically analyzes Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) practices focusing on their absence of dialogue with international arms control and disarmament (ACD) practices. It proposes that a conversation between experts involved in these distinct practices could promote a political discussion on the place of weapons held by state and non-state actors in times of peace. The argument is illustrated through an analysis of the treatment of rules on weapons in the Colombian peace process (2012–present) with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The article concludes that the disconnect between the arms control and disarmament and the peacebuilding associations, as seen in the context of DDR practices, reinstates the rule on the monopoly of violence by the state, preventing a broader discussion of the role of weapons and violence in the building of political communities.