陆军作战仿真模型标准化研究

模型标准化是规范仿真模型开发,避免低水平重复建设的重要环节。在对陆军作战仿真模型体系进行分析和归纳的基础上,对仿真模型架构、模型构建、模型管理以及模型交互进行了标准化设计,提出了基于插件机制的“柔性”仿真模型架构、仿真实体组件化建模机制、采用“方案－单元－实体－组件”方式的仿真实体管理机制以及采用消息驱动、事件订购和分发方式的模型交互机制。     

数字化部队装备维修保障业务流程再造研究

将业务流程再造的思想应用到数字化部队装备保障中,分析数字化部队装备保障业务流程再造的基础,阐述了再造过程中信息技术的运用要求,提出了再造的步骤,最后通过对现有装备修理业务流程的分析,对数字化部队修理业务流程进行了再造的设计构想。     

GPA条件下我国军队服务采购研究

2019年底,我国就加入《政府采购协定》谈判提交了第7份出价清单,军队作为采购实体首次列入其中。在此背景下,我国军队采购在体制机制上应尽快接轨《政府采购协定》的规则,以适应新形势下军队采购的发展需要。当下,服务采购在军队总体采购中的规模和体量正在日益壮大,而相应的军队服务采购的制度、管理和实践却亟待改进。本文首先从采购模式、运行机制、政策法规、业务发展四个方面介绍了军队服务采购的现状,然后从统管力度、法规制度、运行程序、监督仲裁、目录分类五个方面指出了GPA条件下军队服务采购工作存在的问题,最后针对加入GPA将给予军队服务采购工作的影响,给出了相应的对策建议。     

论美军“作战云”理论的制胜机理

美军"作战云"理论的制胜机理是以云计算技术作为物质基础和技术依托,以"云部署、云聚合、云攻击(防御)、云消散"体现作战过程,以"集中指挥、分布式控制和分散执行"为基本指控方式,以"跨域协同"作为作战协同的基本方式。由于该理论实现了战场信息的有效融合和共享,作战力量的动态聚能和释能,作战任务的临时赋予和即时完成以及不同领域作战能力的互补增效,因此将促使美军的武器装备、力量结构、作战方式及战场形态等发生新的重大变化。     

【邀请论文】美军未来司令部探析——成立背景、主要职能与未来前景

新一轮科技革命的快速发展正推动战争形态从信息化向智能化演进。美军作为二战后始终位列世界第一的军事力量,正在积极设计未来战争以应对当前的“大国竞争”,2018年刚刚成立的陆军未来司令部正是在这一背景下产生的。未来司令部隶属于美国陆军,主要负责美陆军新型武器装备的研发、未来作战概念创新以及新兴军事科技的测试和应用。成立两年以来,未来司令部已经拥有了一套完善、严密的组织架构,创造了包括C5ISR作战概念在内的一系列理论成果,在空基导弹、远程精确火力系统等新型作战装备上也取得了众多进展。本文基于大量前沿文献研究,廓清了未来司令部的组织架构,总结了其主要职能,并对这一新设司令部的发展前景进行了展望和预测,期望能够为推进军队现代化和未来化建设提供有益启示。     

From Westphalian Failure to Heterarchic Governance in MENA: The Case of Syria

Abstract

The problematic export of the Westphalian system to MENA is examined, taking Syria as exemplar. The export model is juxtaposed to actual non-lineal trajectories, semi-sovereignty and hybrid or failing states. This is manifested in post-uprising Syria in failing statehood, fragmented and overlapping governance, permeable and collapsing borders, the loss of sovereignty to trans-state movements, “competitive regime-building” between the Asad regime and jihadist warlords, and “competitive interventionism” by external powers filling the governance vacuum with their own proxies. The result is heterarchic zones of limited statehood in which state sovereignty is contested by both international (supra-state) penetration and sub-state fragmentation.     

What explains the failure of U.S. army reconstruction in Afghanistan?

ABSTRACT

This author wrote his doctorate thesis on post-conflict army reconstruction, submitting it in 2011. Continued research on the subject in the intervening seven years indicates that his theoretical propositions can be refined and improved. This article examines refinements to the model, and then applies those refinements in detail to the Afghan case. In so doing, it shifts the focus from potentially altruistic state-building to a case that was driven by pure national-strategic interests. Issues surrounding the liberal peace ideology dominate recent army reconstruction in conflict-affected states. The liberal peace underpinning is of supreme importance, so much so that in many discussions, it is internalised and accepted virtually without thought. This paper will advance the body of knowledge by establishing, for the first time, a theoretical basis for the widespread failure of army reconstruction in Afghanistan. The empirical basis builds on extensive previous research by other scholars. The resulting model can also be applied to better explain outcomes in other similar cases.     

Panjwai: a tale of two COINs in Afghanistan

The US Army has two approaches to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. One is hard, or combat-focused, and the other is soft, or development-focused. This study examines two US Army task forces deployed to Panjwai District, Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. CTF 4-9 and 1-38 offer a meaningful comparison because they pursued these contrasting approaches among the same population and against the same enemy at the same time and place. The study compares each unit’s approach and finds that neither approach was successful absent the other. The article concludes by recommending further research into combining the approaches at the operational level.     

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.