基于TRIZ的陆军装备保障转型活动生成研究

TRIZ是一种通过解决冲突来解决发明问题的理论,具有系统性、科学性和创新性相统一的特点．通过建立陆军装备保障目标能力参数体系,分析目标能力提升中存在的冲突情况并加以解决,建立了基于TRIZ的陆军装备保障转型活动生成方法,以期有效解决装备保障转型活动生成的关键难题．     

基于ANP的装备保障转型影响因素分析

针对装备保障转型影响因素众多、转型重要程度难以确定等问题,分析了保障转型外部和内部影响因素,建立了保障转型影响因素ANP模型,利用ANP方法对装备保障转型影响因素进行了权重确定,为确定装备保障转型影响因素重要性程度提供了一种定量化分析方法,明确了装备保障转型应优先重点解决的关键问题．     

战时装备调配保障决策模型构建研究

分析了战时装备调配保障决策的特点,运用模糊聚类分析法对装备调配保障对象进行了分组和优先级排序,以此为基础,运用目标规划法构建了战时装备调配保障决策模型,最后,通过实例验证了模型的可行性和有效性．     

单小批量武器装备保障的质量屋模型研究

摘要：针对单小批量武器装备保障的特殊需求,对传统的质量屋模型进行了改进,建立了基于装备保障需求与保障规则的质量屋模型,利用整数规划技术进行求解,使得单小批量武器的装备保障规则按照实际保障需求重新排列优先次序,并通过对某型火炮保障方案的筛选验证了模型的正确性．新的质量屋模型发展完善了质量屋的理论与方法,有助于提高单小批量武器的装备保障能力．     

The British army,information management and the First World War revolution in military affairs

Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Croatia's bitter harvest: Total National Defence's role in the Croatian War of Independence

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Fighting on Their Own Terms: The Tactics of the Irish Republican Army 1919-1921

Abstract

The 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War represents one of the earliest instances of a successful insurgent movement in the twentieth century. By combining a fluid organizational structure with effective hit-and-run tactics and accurate intelligence, the Irish Republican Army was able to defeat militarily the security forces of Great Britain. Combined with a successful propaganda campaign, these tactics allowed the IRA to drive the British to the negotiating table, where its representatives secured greater autonomy than Ireland had known in centuries. The outcome of the Anglo-Irish War demonstrates the success which a well-organized guerrilla campaign can achieve, and the tactics used by the IRA must therefore be understood by any serious student of small warfare.     

保障需求分析方法及其应用

针对当前在装备保障需求分析过程中缺乏合适的方法和工具的问题,提出一种基于能力与面向需求分析相结合的装备保障需求分析方法,并通过运用解释结构模型法,对分析结果的结构及相互关系进行科学构建.力求通过该方法的应用,能够辅助论证人员深刻理解和合理判断各种因素之间的相互影响关系,通过结构化和对比化的装备保障需求分析过程得到能正确反映保障需求的关系结构.从而为装备保障发展内容的分析打下良好的理论基础.