综合系统多重递阶控制设计方法研究(一)空-空航炮的机身指向火控解算方法

为了满足综合系统多重递阶控制设计方法的需求,建立了空-空航炮的机身指向火控解算方法.该方法是在期望弹丸命中目标的情况下求解机身期望指向及其变化率.在某验证机的控制增稳系统上,采用所建立的火控解算方法以及综合系统多重递阶控制设计方法,设计了综合飞行/火力控制系统.仿真结果表明,所建立的空-空航炮机身指向火控解算方法较好地满足了综合飞行/火力控制系统的设计需求,获得了良好的综合控制系统动态性能.     

船用复合材料与钢质高压气瓶比较设计

基于网络理论对船用复合材料高压气瓶进行了外形尺寸及厚度设计 ,并与按第三强度理论钢质气瓶的设计结果进行了比较 .结果显示 :钢制高压气瓶的重量是复合材料气瓶的重量的二十几倍     

基于混沌理论的水声信号辨识方法

讨论了目前混沌信号的分析方法,并提出了混沌在水声信号辨识中的应用方法。按照给出的方法,很可能能够解决水下目标自动识别中的许多难题     

复合材料层合圆柱壳的动力响应与层间应力

采用分层壳理论和厚度方向的二次插值函数推导出正交铺设层合圆柱壳的动力响应方程,并得出简支层合圆柱壳自由振动问题的解.对于给定算例,计算出的自振频率与三维分析的结果吻合良好,说明所推导的二维解具有足够精度.计算了前四阶模态对应的壳中应力.计算结果说明,对于高阶模态,层间应力相对于面内应力的比值远高于低阶模态的对应比值,高的层间正应力是高阶模态导致脱层破坏的主要原因.     

基于排队论模型的轮询协议数据链系统时延分析

基于数据链系统的作战方式已经成为了现代化战场的主流,战争中战机稍纵即逝,因此,分析数据链系统的信息传输时延特性意义重大。针对数据链系统信息传输时延问题,分析了数据链系统传输命令消息,目标消息以及中继消息的一般过程,并给出了排队论模型。根据排队论的相关知识得到了轮询协议数据链传输时延的公式,最后利用仿真软件进行了分析研究。     

基于混沌蚁群算法的云计算应用优化研究

以改进蚁群算法应用在云计算中的不足为目的,讨论了蚁群算法基本原理和云计算下应用的缺陷.提出一种适合云计算的混沌蚁群改进算法,该算法通过Logistic映射产生混沌量,根据混沌遍历性和有界性对蚁群算法初始路径进行混沌初始化,同时加入混沌扰动调整算法信息素更新策略,改进了蚁群算法收敛速度慢和易陷入局部最优的缺点.最后通过CloudSim搭建仿真云环境并进行算法调度实验,通过横向对比标准蚁群算法和Dijkstra算法,证明混沌蚁群算法在执行效率和相对标准差等方面优于其他算法,更加适合于云计算环境.     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013