基于模糊证据理论的船舶安全评估

针对船舶安全评估过程中的诸多不确定因素,提出了一种基于模糊证据理论的安全评估方法.将证据体空间中的事件视为模糊子集,并引入模糊概率,更好地描述了专家意见(或知识),给出了质量分配函数的表示.最后,结合某船舶系统,给出了其安全评估的具体实现过程.结果表明,该方法可靠、有效.     

复合材料层合圆柱壳的动力响应与层间应力

采用分层壳理论和厚度方向的二次插值函数推导出正交铺设层合圆柱壳的动力响应方程,并得出简支层合圆柱壳自由振动问题的解.对于给定算例,计算出的自振频率与三维分析的结果吻合良好,说明所推导的二维解具有足够精度.计算了前四阶模态对应的壳中应力.计算结果说明,对于高阶模态,层间应力相对于面内应力的比值远高于低阶模态的对应比值,高的层间正应力是高阶模态导致脱层破坏的主要原因.     

Minimizing weighted earliness and tardiness penalties in single‐machine scheduling with idle time permitted

In this paper, a single‐machine scheduling problem with weighted earliness and tardiness penalties is considered. Idle time between two adjacent jobs is permitted and due dates of jobs could be unequal. The dominance rules are utilized to develop a relationship matrix, which allows a branch‐and‐bound algorithm to eliminate a high percentage of infeasible solutions. After combining this matrix with a branching strategy, a procedure to solve the problem is proposed. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 760–780, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10039     

基于排队论的空降兵部队安全着陆问题研究

针对空降兵部队安全着陆问题,首先建立空降排队模型,明确空降作战受到火力打击时为混合制排队论问题,对具体空降参数进行了分析与计算,得到了比较科学的结果,与实际基本相符,然后根据结果分析了各种参数对空降作战的影响,提出了空降作战提高安全着陆人数的对策,对空降作战人数的安排及火力的支援提供了较强的参考价值,为开展空降作战相关问题研究提供可借鉴的思路方法。     

综合目标识别的输入信息源研究

利用多源信息进行综合目标识别能提高识别的准确性和及时性,为了解决综合目标识别中输入信息源的运用问题,通过分析各种输入信息源的特点,根据这些特点分别采用了针对性的技术手段转化和处理,为最后的识别决策提供了有效的信息,对进一步深入研究综合目标识别具有参考价值。     

党的第三代领导集体对正确处理人民内部矛盾理论的丰富和发展

以江泽民为核心的党的第三代领导集体,在建立社会主义市场经济的形势下,进一步丰富和发展了毛泽东正确处理人民内部矛盾的理论。主要表现在:深化了对正确处理人民内部矛盾重要意义的认识,开拓了正确认识人民内部矛盾的新领域,发展了依法正确处理人民内部矛盾的思想,以公开、公平、公正为准则领导了正确处理人民内部矛盾的新实践。     

基于阶次小波包与粗糙集的轴承故障诊断

针对齿轮箱启动过程中振动信号表现为非平稳、非高斯特征及传统诊断方法诊断精度不高的现状,将阶次小波包和粗糙集理论引入轴承的故障诊断中,提出了一种新的故障诊断方法。首先利用阶次跟踪算法对瞬态振动信号进行重采样,得到等角度分布振动信号,其次采用小波包对该信号分解—重构,并对每个频段的能量进行归一化,构成特征向量,通过粗糙集理论得到清晰、简明的决策规则,最后通过故障实例验证该方法的有效性。     

基于步进加速寿命试验的制导弹药储存寿命评估

介绍步进应力加速寿命试验原理,通过对制导弹药自动导引头贮存状态和失效机理的分析,确定了加速寿命试验应力和应力水平．假设产品寿命服从威布尔分布,应用极大似然估计和Bayes的方法处理数据,建立制导弹药可靠储存寿命预测模型,并计算得到自动导引头在正常应力水平下的可靠储存寿命．     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.