鱼雷生产定型实航工作可靠度的Bayes评估方法

鱼雷实航工作可靠度是鱼雷可靠性评定中的重要指标。针对鱼雷生产定型试验量小的特点,提出一种综合利用不同研制阶段可靠性信息的Bayes评估方法。实例分析表明,该方法通过合理利用设计定型阶段和生产定型阶段的先验信息,可以有效减小生产定型阶段的试验量,具有良好的评估精度。     

基于认知无线电的无线传感网系统设计与实现

为了提高认知无线电传感器网络(CRSN)中的能量使用效率和性能指标,提出了一种新的基于认知无线电的无线传感网系统,该系统中的传感器节点均使用改进的机会频谱接入路由协议,提出的协议能够更好地增加网络的可扩展性和提高网络性能。构建了精确的信道模型以便评估复杂的室内环境不同区域的信号强度,通过实验模拟对提出系统的性能进行评估。模拟结果显示,相比其他两种路由协议,提出的协议在吞吐量、包延迟及总能量消耗方面表现更佳。     

一种基于二分法的无线传感器网络拓扑控制算法

文中针对传感器节点分布不均和拓扑建立时间长的问题,提出了一种基于二分法的拓扑控制算法,每个节点自适应选择发射功率以获得预设的度。仿真显示,与基于均匀功率增量的算法相比,基于二分法的拓扑控制算法大大减少了功率切换次数且形成的拓扑简单,减少了网络拓扑形成时间和平均发射功率。     

基于遭遇角决策的并行双模切换舵减摇控制

结合舵减摇控制中通用线性模型与模糊线性模型的优缺点,采用了一种根据遭遇角的不同自动切换控制器设计模型的并行双模切换舵减摇控制方案。为在线自动辨识遭遇角,提出基于横摇功率谱密度柱状图的神经网络辨识方法。仿真结果表明,该方法辨识精度较高,且比传统重心法节省了在线计算量与存储数据库所需的存储空间,简化了辨识流程。     

军用无线传感器网络体系结构研究

无线传感器网络作为一种全新的监测系统被广泛认为是军用侦查探测系统的发展方向,已经成为国际军事领域研究热点。在总结了几种无线传感器网络体系结构的基础上,针对军用领域特定的性能需求,对这些体系结构进行了比较。     

Network design for time‐constrained delivery

To meet customer demand, delivery companies are offering an increasing number of time‐definite services. In this article, we examine the strategic design of delivery networks which can efficiently provide these services. Because of the high cost of direct connections, we focus on tree‐structured networks. As it may not be possible to identify a tree‐structured network that satisfies all of the delivery guarantees, we allow these guarantees to be violated but seek to minimize the sum of the violations. We establish the complexity of the problem and exploit an empirically identified solution structure to create new neighborhoods which improve solution values over more general neighborhood structures. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Strategic capacity decision‐making in a stochastic manufacturing environment using real‐time approximate dynamic programming

In this study, we illustrate a real‐time approximate dynamic programming (RTADP) method for solving multistage capacity decision problems in a stochastic manufacturing environment, by using an exemplary three‐stage manufacturing system with recycle. The system is a moderate size queuing network, which experiences stochastic variations in demand and product yield. The dynamic capacity decision problem is formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP). The proposed RTADP method starts with a set of heuristics and learns a superior quality solution by interacting with the stochastic system via simulation. The curse‐of‐dimensionality associated with DP methods is alleviated by the adoption of several notions including “evolving set of relevant states,” for which the value function table is built and updated, “adaptive action set” for keeping track of attractive action candidates, and “nonparametric k nearest neighbor averager” for value function approximation. The performance of the learned solution is evaluated against (1) an “ideal” solution derived using a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation, which assumes full knowledge of future realized values of the stochastic variables (2) a myopic heuristic solution, and (3) a sample path based rolling horizon MIP solution. The policy learned through the RTADP method turned out to be superior to polices of 2 and 3. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2010     

稳定自组织网络结构中单点突变对网络稳定性影响

从战场恶劣环境通信设备无法正常通信的条件下,介绍了一种自组织网络稳定度的模型。通过比较自组织网络结构中微结构和巨结构的优缺点,动态地描述了结构间的聚合和裂解。基于结构分析,考虑单点突变对网络稳定性的影响,从时间因素策略方面,提出了一个基于预测最稳定链路生存时间的一种分布式成群策略。通过合理建模以及优化路由算法,尽可能地维护网络结构的稳定。     

基于复杂网络的作战描述模型研究

针对传统作战模型重点关注兵力的毁伤,不能充分地反映信息时代作战的特点,提出了一个基于复杂网络的作战描述模型,把作战单元抽象成节点,把各单元之间的相互作用抽象成有向边,将战场描述为一个由传感器、决策器、影响器、目标四类节点组成的有向网络图。定义了网络模型的若干特征参数,把作战环看成是反映作战能力的指标,并区别分析了标准作战环和广义作战环,能更好地反映信息时代作战的特点。最后实例研究了传统作战条件下决策器连通程度的变化给作战能力带来的影响。     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.