COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

车载火控系统标定原理及误差分析

巡航导弹的快速发展改变了现代战争的作战模式,为了实现对该目标的有效拦截,将防空火控系统组网是一种有效手段。文中以车载火控系统组网为例,介绍了火控系统两种标定方法的原理,并结合目标态势对误差进行了分析,结果表明系统标定引入的误差与定位定向设备精度、标定系统距离和目标态势都是相关的。     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of territorial consolidation, 2006–2012

Since 2002 the Colombian government has been implementing a series of policy initiatives that have sought to coordinate state resources in a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach to fight the country's main insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and recover and consolidate the territory. Despite impressive operational successes against the insurgency and other illegal groups, the government has been unable to reassert its control and build legitimacy via the state-building effort known as ‘Consolidación’, in some of the most recalcitrant areas of the country. This article examines two areas where government efforts at consolidation appear to be failing to discuss the limits of COIN theory and practice.     

基于MDFT框架的海上能源通道航线动态决策建模与仿真

针对常规海上航线决策没有考虑决策选择过程的问题,引入多选择决策场理论（ MDFT）,构建了海上能源通道航线动态决策模型。基于信息完备、信息不确定和特殊情况等三种情景想定,进行了海上能源通道航线规划决策及其实验仿真。结果表明,决策过程受时间压力和信息质量的制约,时间压力会制约决策质量,同时还可能引起“偏好逆转”现象,信息不确定也会导致确定性决策。该模型不仅综合考虑了海上能源通道航线选择时需关注的各类要素,且模型参数可动态调整,进而能合理模拟真实的海上状况和决策过程。     

贝叶斯在装备技术实验结果信息解释决策中的应用

针对目前不能对装备技术实验结果信息进行有效解释,将贝叶斯决策方法引入到装备技术实验的结果信息分析当中,克服由于实验本身性质及主观因素造成的实验结果信息具有“欺骗”性的弊端.基于贝叶斯基本理论及相关研究成果.分析贝叶斯决策在装备技术实验中的应用目的和应用步骤并给出了应用实例,为提高相关人员正确决策提供了科学方法.     

一种可靠的协作式频谱感知方案

高可靠性的频谱感知是认知无线电实现的基础.在认知无线电网络环境下,提出了一种可靠的合作频谱感知方案.认知网络中的独立节点分别计算频谱感知结果的可信任程度,融合中心预分选各节点的感知结果,剔除终端的错误感知数据,利用D-S证据融合方法得到最终感知结果.该方式能够克服阴影效应、衰落信道以及自私设备所造成的感知信息失真问题....     

基于可信度理论的一种态势估计方法

态势估计是战场决策的基础,而如何进行正确的战场决策对战斗有着重要的影响。在对态势估计进行分析的基础上,根据可信度理论,提出了一种对态势估计问题进行推理的方法。该方法能够进行融合推理得到态势假设和事件之间的潜在关系,为决策提供依据。实例验证的结果表明,此方法对当前战场态势可给出有效的综合评价和理解,具有较高的可信性。