Terrorism in Nigeria

Using the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria as a point of departure, this paper examines the implications of the operations of terrorist groups on the security and stability of states in West Africa. It predominantly utilises secondary sources of data. Findings indicate that the membership and operations of this terrorist group are spreading across the sub-region. This spread is consequent upon Boko Haram's collaboration with other terrorist groups within West Africa and beyond. This constitutes threats to the security and stability of states in the sub-region. Thus, the paper recommends, among other things: a thorough understanding of the operational strategies of terrorist groups by states and those involved in security policymaking in the sub-region; and for agreements to be reached among Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states and their governments for collaboration in various areas in order to curtail transnational crime and terrorism, and reduce socio-economic inequality that generates aggressive behaviours among the less privileged.     

2015 and the survival of the Nigerian State

Nigeria is currently faced with serious domestic challenges. While the state is not officially at war, it is standing on the precipice, especially with the eruption of violence occasioned by the emergence of the Boko Haram sect and the tenuous peace in the Niger Delta. With the 2015 general elections on the horizon, fears of further violence and disintegration are rife, more so because of the debate over who occupies the Presidential Villa at Abuja. President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, seems poised for a comeback even amidst the vociferous challenge posed by the political elites of northern Nigeria. This article looks at the different scenarios that might play out in 2015. It analyses the challenges of the survival of the Nigerian state, and makes some policy recommendations that Nigeria and its people need to put into place in order to ensure its survival beyond 2015.     

Resistance through Islamic clerics against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria

Islamic clerics and scholars constitute one of the community actors affected by the Boko Haram crisis in northern Nigeria. This group is also one that is most familiar with the essential doctrinal elements required to deconstruct the narrative pushed by Boko Haram in a crisis where ideology represents a vital aspect. While not undermining the bearing which socio-economic and political issues have on the crisis, this paper frames the focus to emphasise the long-term battle where Islamic clerics are involved in winning hearts and minds. Drawing upon fieldwork conducted in Sokoto State and Borno State, this paper highlights the influential role of clerics in communal mobilisation and resistance against Boko Haram. It is suggested that a deeper integration of this community actor into the broader counter-insurgency struggle in northern Nigeria would be beneficial.     

The multidimensional nature of the Boko Haram conflict

ABSTRACT

The debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime.     

Boko Haram and the challenges of Nigeria's war on terror

Boko Haram terrorism has been recognized by Nigerian President Jonathan as the most threatening and complex security issue in Nigeria since independence. In response, the Federal Government of Nigeria has committed itself to different counterterrorism measures, which are largely dominated by “hard politics” and military mobilization. Spending heavily on defense to upgrade military hardware and train personnel in a counterterrorism role, Nigeria has also boosted its strategic importance in the “Global War on Terror”. However, this attempt has become unpopular as it has failed to contain Boko Haram within a short time frame and has made insufficient headway against unabated terror, with human rights costs among the host communities and amidst a surge of stakeholders' discordance. As a matter of concern, this article seeks to assess Boko Haram as an opponent in Nigeria's war on terror (WOT) and to ascertain the challenges the country faces, the alternative measures open to it, and possible ways forward.     

Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria’s counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

Since the 2003 war in Iraq, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly legitimate actors in modern conflicts. Despite this normative shift, rumours in March 2015 regarding the use of South African mercenaries in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram insurgents caused an international outrage, while the Nigerian government remained nonchalantly silent on the matter. This article investigates the impact of mercenaries on the conflict in the last six months of the Jonathan government. Using primary and secondary qualitative research, it assesses the role that PMSCs played in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy, along with the ensuing reaction of international and local media to the outsourcing of violence to foreign companies. The article concludes that – notwithstanding the improved image of PMSCs in the world, and the actual impact of the contractors on the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort – the stigma of mercenaries continues to plague the industry, particularly on the African continent.     

Underselling Islamist extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Islamist extremism as an ideology has seemingly spread in influence in the past few years. The violent Islamist threat may have a singular religious dogma, but that does not mean that it will interact in the same fashion within the various cultures it infests. The Sub-Saharan region is one general context where Islamist extremism is both vividly active and misunderstood. Africa's reaction to: Arabization; the adjustment to post-colonial rule; the perception of secular government institutions; the extent of cultural and religious pluralism; and the local character of Muslim leadership and institutions are all very different from that of the Middle East. Scores of terrorism analysts and even Arab populations only too familiar with the Middle East context superimpose Middle East threats over the Sub-Saharan African cultural landscape. Instead of generalizing the Islamist threats, it might be better to ask why it is that violent Islamist groups have traditionally been challenged to expand their influence in Muslim Sub-Saharan Africa. The underestimated Islamist is using ignorance to its advantage, recruiting through channels unnoticed by its Arab counterparts while creatively catering its message by region.     

An overview of conflict in Africa in 2014

Violent conflict escalated in Africa in 2014, with five sub-Saharan states – the Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan – accounting for an estimated 75% of all conflict-related deaths on the continent. This paper provides an overview of the five major sub-Saharan African conflicts in 2014 and considers the underlying causes and dynamics in the Seleka/anti-Balaka conflict in the CAR, the Islamist threats of Boko Haram and al-Shabaab in Nigeria and Somalia, the civil war in South Sudan, and the long-running conflict between Sudan's government and southern and Darfuri rebels. The paper unpacks the general trends evident in these conflicts and the implications for the settlement thereof, including the targeting of civilians, ethnic and religious mobilisation and the state as epicentre of violence. The paper concludes with a brief look ahead to 2015.     

Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?

The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that Jonathan's growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a major role in the president's sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.     

State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria

Abstract

The emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organisation has dominated recent discourse in the fields of political science and security studies, both within and without the socio-politico enclave known as Nigeria. Much of the discussion has centred on the extra-judicial execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, which purportedly intensified the radicalisation of the group, and whether or not the sect receives operational and/or financial support from foreign terrorist associations. The interest of others has been to forecast the possibility of the internationalisation of the group's activities. This paper aligns with those whose interest is to identify and proffer ways of resolving factors that predisposed the Nigerian state to the levels of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, with a view to averting much greater crises in the future. It adopts some historicism in demonstrating that the responsibility for the deepening insecurity in the country resides in the Nigerian state structure, which has often been seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. On the whole, the paper utilises state fragility as the framework of analysis by identifying the incapacity of the state in effective service delivery, which has as a result created a situation of mass unemployment and extreme poverty that has fanned the Boko Haram uprising. It concludes that a sustainable solution to the crisis lies in addressing the root causes of inequality, unemployment and poverty, with which most Nigerians, particularly in the north, subsist.