TOPSIS法用于区域防空重点保卫目标排序计算

区域防空作战中优化选择重点保卫目标,集中部署优势防空兵力,才能确保重点目标不受或少受损失.分析了影响保卫目标重要性的主要因素,采取德尔菲法获得指标值,采用层次分析法得到指标权重,利用逼近理想解的排序法对保卫目标的重要性进行了定量分析.最后通过算例对算法的正确性和实用性进行了验证.     

On the normality and abnormality of offsets obligations

Defence offsets have often been described as government‐to‐business compensation arrangements or contracts involving “reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange”. This paper argues that it is irrelevant and misleading to use this notion as a criterion for defining offsets.

The paper also explores the apparent inconsistency between the maximising efficiency in defence procurement and the application of offsets requirements. It is shown that defence offsets are a subset of all the price‐quality‐quantity trade‐offs which in general characterise negotiations surrounding complex transactions.

It is argued that although reciprocal or offsetting arrangements are a normal aspect of commercial transacting, the operation of certain offsets schemes namely mandatory offsets obligations, may inhibit the buyer's flexibility in negotiating deals and result in inefficient procurement. This leads us to ask why these offsets schemes have persisted for so long.     

The German arms industry in a European context: A study in successful downsizing

Defence offsets rank as one of the most important and controversial topics within the broad field of defence economics. Arms vendors are likely to view offsetting investment as a distraction, fearful of its potential to hurt the bottom line. By contrast, policymakers in the arms purchasing countries see offsets as an opportunity to extract technology transfer, as well as employment, investment and export sales opportunities. Establishing the actual impact of offsets, however, is not easy. The subject is shrouded in secrecy and myth, with anecdote and generalisation pervading even the intellectual press. This paper seeks to break the mould by offering an empirical case study of the role of offsets in Malaysian defence industrialisation.     

The comparison of military budgets of the eastern and central European countries

The evolutions of military expenditures in Eastern and Central European countries are difficult to estimate and to compare, due to the lack of available data for these states. Some results of the extent of cuts in defence spending since 1990 are interesting to interpret, but it is difficult for econometricians to use these figures even carefully. The structures of national military expenditure have been modified to the detriment of arms equipment. Thus, the disarmament process needs a special analysis of the arms industry.     

Country survey IX: Spain

From the early 1980s Spain embarked on a wide‐ranging process of military reform, from organisational changes to defence industrial policies. Investment in military equipment was set to grow, policies were drawn up to foster the domestic defence industrial base, defence R&D rocketed, and Spain joined a myriad of international arms development programmes. Yet, by 1991 the process of reform had run out of steam. Expenditure planning proved unreliable, and firms suffered from sharp cutbacks in procurement expenditure. The model of defence industrial growth sketched in the mid‐1980s had floundered. The Spanish case provides an example of how the quest to maximise defence procurement from domestic sources can fall victim to industrial and budgetary constraints. Spanish defence producers are now becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign defence companies.     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Colonial violence and its ‘Small Wars’: fighting the Kuki ‘guerillas’ during the Great War in Northeast India, 1917–1919

ABSTRACT

This paper concerns the lesser known British counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Northeast frontier of India during the First World War. Officially known as the ‘Kuki Operations’, it was considered as part of the Great War. Carried out in isolation from press and public, and shelved in colonial archives, the event remained invisible until today. Yet, it registers a critical case of colonial COIN doctrine where the ‘moral effect’ doctrine was employed without being questioned. It unleashed enormous amount of organized violence, ranging from shoot at sight to indiscriminate burning of villages, wholesale destruction of property and livestock, prevention of cultivation and rebuilding of villages, forced mass displacement in jungles or in ‘concentration camps’, and collective punishment (communal penal labour and payment of compensation) after the war. This paper argues that the theory of ‘minimum force’ and the practicability of the ‘moral effect’ doctrine as applied by the Empire, sit oddly with each other at the frontier, where violence was seen both as a natural and moral orders. Violence as an ‘imperatively necessary’ method to bring order in a disorderly frontier, in the opinion of colonial state, informs and registers Northeast India as geography of violence.     

The structure of the defense industry and the security needs of the country: a differentiated products model

This paper models the interactions between the defense needs of the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods, and the defense industry market structure. The results show that net defense costs of the USA and Europe are lower when the number of defense firms in each arms‐producing country is small and when the world prices of the defense goods are high. The model predicts that the increase in world prices will crowd‐out countries in the developing world from the market for modern weapon systems and may force them to develop and use ‘cheap and dirty’ weapon systems.     

Chains,networks and shifting paradigms: the UK defence industry supply system

Industrial supply chains have emerged as the focus of much economic and business research over the previous decade and defence is no exception. This paper reviews contributions made to the body of knowledge in this field with particular attention given to primary research undertaken on the UK defence industrial supply system. In doing so, the author assesses the quantity and quality of knowledge available to researchers, analysts and policy makers. There have been a number of valuable contributions to the literature and this paper reveals a subject that is extremely complicated, dynamic and yet under‐researched. It is suggested that it may well be this complexity and dynamism, coupled with difficulty in accessing data, that has inhibited research development in this field. Defence industry supply systems are repeatedly referred to as ‘chains’; however, primary research consistently suggests this is a misnomer – the author concludes that future analysis of the UK defence sector must embrace directly the economics of networks if understanding of the same is to progress and industrial ‘invisibility’ is to be avoided.