基于排列法的目标威胁评估模型

目标威胁评估是一个推理、决策的行为,结合现代防空作战的特点和指挥自动化系统的工作过程,分析了影响目标威胁评估的几个重要因素,应用多属性决策中的一种改进排列法建立了数学模型,验证了其可行性。     

如何在防化科研试验中加强安全保密工作

针对我院科研试验的特点和要求,分析了安全保密工作的艰巨性和重要性,明确了安全保密总要求,提出了把安全保密工作落到实处的具体措施。     

反舰导弹发展趋势分析及其末端防御

分析了现代反舰导弹的特点(包括超声速反舰导弹的弱点)及未来发展趋势,论述了当前国外反导防御的手段及新思想,指出末端防御的重要性。主要讨论了目前防空反导系统存在的困难及火控系统存在的局限性,总结了反舰导弹末端具有的弱点(红外特征明显、速度过大不易机动等),从系统的角度论述了末端拦截反舰导弹的可行性及需研究的新技术。     

The mercurial development of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation

Russia's 2006 renationalisation of its aerospace industry heralded a new era in industrial policy. Symbolising a return to the importance of securing sovereignty over the Federation's strategic assets, it also posits, powerfully, that sectors like aerospace and shipbuilding are too important to be left to the market. In what now appears a reversal of this policy approach, Moscow is promoting partial privatisation and encouraging partnership with Western aerospace companies. Foreign infusion of capital and technology is viewed as the catalyst for Russian dominance in the global military and commercial aerospace industries.     

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.     

Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944

This article compares the philosophy and practice of command in the British and US Armies during the Italian Campaign of 1943–44. It assesses pre-war influences on the command approach adopted by each army, and shows how refinements derived from wartime experience enabled British and American commanders to successfully utilise mission command principles to outfight the German Army in the latter years of World War II. This examination directly challenges the historical consensus that Allied commanders were disadvantaged by an inability to exploit the advantages of mission command, and that the German Army retained superior command practices, despite its other failings, throughout the fighting between 1939 and 1945. These conclusions hold additional relevance to modern military organisations which have emphasised mission command as the optimal solution to effective command in battle since the 1980s, but from an inaccurate understanding of German, British and American command traditions and experience that persists to this day.     

The strategic utility of New Zealand Special Forces

In 1955, the New Zealand government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British forces in Malaya to counter a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Drawing upon the operational experiences of the New Zealand SAS largely taken from the Cold War period, and underpinned by Colin Gray's Special Forces essentials of ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’, this article will show how New Zealand's SAS is now accepted not only as a respected and relevant part of the nation's military capability, but also empowers its political decision-makers with the confidence to take on significant, and at times difficult, strategic foreign-policy choices.     

Country survey III — Defence spending in West Germany

This survey article deals with defence spending in West Germany from 1960 on, and the resulting manpower levels and major weapons of the Federal Armed forces, focusing on macro‐economic aspects. Statistics compiled from a variety of published and unpublished sources are presented in 16 tables. An econometric defence‐spending function is derived for the period. For comparison, the equivalent data of East Germany from the last years is also presented. The small set of developments in the next few years that can be predicted firmly are discussed.     

‘I have seen the future and it works’: The US defence industry transformation – lessons for the UK defence industrial base

The US has embarked upon a major transformation of its approach to defence industrial base planning. Although bureaucratic and industrial inertia, as well as budgetary constraints, may delay transformation, its effects will lead to radical changes in the US defence industrial base with new entrants and new combinations of players. The UK, with more modest defence ambitions, capabilities and budget, will seek to keep in touch with the US. However, a commercially‐led drive to embed UK industry even more deeply in the US defence market could be the last step in creating a largely US–UK North Atlantic relationship, with much of Europe very much a subsidiary business concern. This contains a risk that the UK will become increasingly dependent on the US for design and integration of major systems and national defence industrial capability focused on a limited number of niche technologies.     

ANALYSING DEFENCE DEPENDENCY: THE IMPACT OF THE ROYAL NAVY ON A SUB‐REGIONAL ECONOMY

This paper provides a methodology for estimating the economic impact of defence spending at a sub‐regional level. It does so by calculating the income and employment generated by Britain’s Royal Navy and associated defence activities in the City of Portsmouth and its surrounding area, during the financial year 2003–2004. In an era of military consolidation, the paper offers an insight into the multifaceted impact of defence‐related expenditure. Hence, it presents a generic framework that could prove useful to other researchers when seeking to measure the sub‐regional impact of naval, airforce and army facilities in other national contexts.