The British army,information management and the First World War revolution in military affairs

Information Management (IM) – the systematic ordering, processing and channelling of information within organisations – forms a critical component of modern military command and control systems. As a subject of scholarly enquiry, however, the history of military IM has been relatively poorly served. Employing new and under-utilised archival sources, this article takes the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War as its case study and assesses the extent to which its IM system contributed to the emergence of the modern battlefield in 1918. It argues that the demands of fighting a modern war resulted in a general, but not universal, improvement in the BEF’s IM techniques, which in turn laid the groundwork, albeit in embryonic form, for the IM systems of modern armies.     

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

Colonial violence and its ‘Small Wars’: fighting the Kuki ‘guerillas’ during the Great War in Northeast India, 1917–1919

ABSTRACT

This paper concerns the lesser known British counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Northeast frontier of India during the First World War. Officially known as the ‘Kuki Operations’, it was considered as part of the Great War. Carried out in isolation from press and public, and shelved in colonial archives, the event remained invisible until today. Yet, it registers a critical case of colonial COIN doctrine where the ‘moral effect’ doctrine was employed without being questioned. It unleashed enormous amount of organized violence, ranging from shoot at sight to indiscriminate burning of villages, wholesale destruction of property and livestock, prevention of cultivation and rebuilding of villages, forced mass displacement in jungles or in ‘concentration camps’, and collective punishment (communal penal labour and payment of compensation) after the war. This paper argues that the theory of ‘minimum force’ and the practicability of the ‘moral effect’ doctrine as applied by the Empire, sit oddly with each other at the frontier, where violence was seen both as a natural and moral orders. Violence as an ‘imperatively necessary’ method to bring order in a disorderly frontier, in the opinion of colonial state, informs and registers Northeast India as geography of violence.     

刍议抛锚式教学策略在教育学课程教学中的应用

抛锚式教学把学生设于真实的情境中,让学生达到认知冲突,让学生自己去分析问题、学习解决该问题所需的知识,逐步地解决问题。作为教师职前教育的一门重要的基础课程教育学,其教学效果一直不尽如人意。而抛锚式教学法为教育学的教学模式改啦提供了一种新的思路。     

Market entry strategy in the presence of market spillovers and efficiency differentiation

Firms form various alliances or use brand extensions to enter new markets in order to improve their operational efficiency and create a positive spillover. However, they do not always know the implications of these strategies for market entry and multimarket competition because the sale of products in one market can have negative spillover effects on product sales in other markets. We present an analytical framework to examine whether and how (i.e., by choosing alliance entry or independent entry) competing firms should enter a market in a situation where market spillovers occur when a firm enters a spillover-producing market to sell products that may increase or decrease the consumers' willingness to pay for products in the primary market. Our analysis shows that the operational efficiency (or quality differentiation ability) of firms in a spillover-producing market varies, and hence, the impact of market spillovers differs for firms. We identify the key factors, such as bargaining power, brand value difference in the primary market, and the extent of efficiencies and spillovers, that determine the firms benefitting from the different entry strategies. Specifically, we show that firms would be more willing to choose an alliance strategy to enter a spillover-producing market if the negative spillover is small and alliance efficiency is high. In contrast, if an alliance entry is not favored, the firms' relative operational efficiency is crucial for them to decide whether to enter the market independently under moderate spillover conditions. Finally, we show the implications of market entry strategies for managers.     

Strategy selection: an info-gap methodology

The evaluation and selection of military strategy requires consideration of myriad factors – social, historical, political, geographical and technological – together with vast uncertainties encompassing all these domains. Info-gap decision theory is a conceptual framework that can support these deliberations and that has substantive implications for the formulation, evaluation and selection of strategic goals and of the means to attain them. In particular, while the analyst may desire to reliably achieve the best possible outcome, info-gap theory provides a critique of, and alternative to, the paradigm of optimizing the outcome of a decision. In selecting between strategy alternatives, the analyst must sometimes choose between one alternative that is purportedly better than another, but also more uncertain. Such a choice is a dilemma whose resolution requires the analyst to balance between the different predicted qualities of each alternative and their different vulnerabilities to uncertainty. The dilemma can be managed with the info-gap methodology of robustly satisfying critical requirements.     

全球治理视角下奥巴马政府太空战略解读

作为重要的全球公域范围与全球治理对象之一,太空既面临着日益严峻的资源、环境与安全问题,又不断彰显着其极具地缘政治意义的战略地位,攸关国家利益与安全。自进入太空时代以来,争夺和维持太空领域的领先地位一直是美国不懈追求的目标。美国的经济、军事等国家实力越来越依赖太空,同时其太空资产的脆弱性也愈发凸显。面对新的国际国内形势与外空态势的复合挑战,奥巴马政府适时调整了美国的太空战略。文章以全球公域和全球治理为切入视角,在分析太空领域全球治理现状的基础上,从太空活动行为准则的制定、太空国际合作的深入、太空军备竞赛的规制三个层面解读奥巴马政府的新版太空战略,并探讨其深层次的动因与影响,进而为中国参与太空领域的全球治理提供有益的理论支撑与现实参考。