MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

The British Army, ‘Understanding’, and the Illusion of Control

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine – JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ – designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure.     

Classical geopolitics,realism and the balance of power theory

Since the end of World War II, classical geopolitics as a particular form of realism has been disengaged from the development of mainstream realist theories. This disengagement has not only concealed the value of classical geopolitics as a framework of analysis for policy and strategy, but also created an increasing rift between theory and policy in contemporary realist theories. This paper seeks to reengage classical geopolitics with mainstream realist theories by clarifying its realist traits and analytical characteristics, (re)stating its core propositions and probing into its potential contribution to the development of mainstream realist theories. This paper contends that classical geopolitics, while having a distinctive pedigree, can arguably be considered an integral part of the family of realist theories in view of its basic theoretical assumptions concerning international anarchy, the unit of analysis and power politics. As a framework of analysis, classical geopolitics incorporates three interrelated strategic propositions. Those three propositions not only constitute the theoretical core of classical geopolitics, but also manifest a peculiar balance-of-power conception that is essentially distinct from those proposed by mainstream realist theories. This paper argues that those three propositions combined promise to fill in prominent lacuna in the balance-of-power research programme, and also have significant implications for contemporary world politics.     

Think again – supplying war: reappraising military logistics and its centrality to strategy and war

This article argues that logistics constrains strategic opportunity while itself being heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning. With the academic literature all but ignoring the centrality of logistics to strategy and war, this article argues for a reappraisal of the critical role of military logistics, and posits that the study and conduct of war and strategy are incomplete at best or false at worst when they ignore this crucial component of the art of war. The article conceptualises the logistics–strategy nexus in a novel way, explores its contemporary manifestation in an age of uncertainty, and applies it to a detailed case study of UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.     

英语泛读易出现的问题及对策

针对大学英语泛读教学中易出现的问题,系统分析了产生这些问题的主观和客观原因,并提出了解决这些问题的具体办法--教师在泛读课上应把握各教学环节,以"参与者"的身份引导学生阅读,是提高学生阅读能力的重要途径.     

Super-Weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War

This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. It argues that the LCS faced significant challenges in implementing its deceptions. Repeating the great strategic successes of the Second World War was extremely difficult; what remained for the Cold War were more limited deceptions.     

“Respect” as a personal attribute in the British Army

This article describes the results of research into the social phenomenon of “respect” as framed by junior members of the British Army, as part of a wider study into the Values and Standards of the British Army. This research was interview based, using qualitative analysis software to detect, manage, and draw conclusions from the qualitative data recorded in those interviews. The data indicated that the primary situation in which “respect” was visualised by the participants was the unit context, and that it comprised a combination of three different strands: respect for rank or “hierarchical respect,” “professional respect” for a person's military competence, and “personal respect” for an individual's character, personal behaviour, and attributes. The overall respect that an individual is given arises from the combination of these three areas. “Respect” as a concept was, in the soldiers’ characterisation, something that had to be earned (except for the “given” represented by rank) and was not stable: a person's fund of respect could go up or down in social value. Respect was also linked to trust: the more respect a person had, the more they could be trusted. Although the unit context was the primary one for discussing their framing of the concept of respect, many of the participants reported a wider dimension in which every human being deserves a basic level of respect simply for being human, and this level could not be forfeited.     

From rivals to partners: AirSea Battle and the US air force–navy relationship

AirSea Battle (ASB) has generated significant publicity, controversy, and debate among scholars, analysts, commentators, and observers of US defense strategy. However, a research gap exists concerning formal analysis of the impact of the operational concept on the relationship between the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN). The impact of the ASB operational concept on the USAF–USN relationship is examined across the issue areas of strategy, budgets, weapons procurement, and training. These four issue areas represent important areas of historical conflict and competition between the Air Force and Navy. The conclusion is that ASB is ushering in a new era of Air Force–Navy partnership that advances the inter-service dynamic from “jointness” toward integration. The emergent USAF–USN partnership therefore represents a significant development in US defense politics and defense strategy.     

矩阵变换器自抗扰控制策略研究

矩阵变换器的输出电压易受各种因素的影响,为了改善输出性能,将自抗扰控制技术应用于矩阵变换器的闭环控制中。分析了自抗扰控制器的特性,提出了一种双闭环自抗扰控制策略,即电流内环与电压外环均采用一阶简化的自抗扰控制算法。仿真结果表明:该方法不仅可以有效地抑制多种扰动的影响,而且比PI控制具有更优的动静态性能,可满足高性能矩阵变换器系统的控制要求。     

单兵信息系统协同作战技术研究

协同作战是提高体系作战能力,发挥整体作战效能的关键,针对单兵班组在未来信息化条件下单兵作战单元协同作战的协同模式、协同流程、协同策略,协同指挥、协同作战效能评估等方面进行阐释,对未来单兵信息系统班组协同作战技术研究具有一定的指导意义。