基于子空间投影波束形成技术的导航接收机抗干扰算法研究

阵列天线空时自适应处理通过联合空域和时域的自适应滤波处理技术能够有效提高导航接收机的窄带和宽带干扰抑制性能。利用导航信号淹没在干扰信号和热噪声的特点,本文提出先将天线阵列接收的空时信号矢量向干扰子空间的正交子空间投影以实现干扰抑制,当接收机对投影后的参考阵元数据捕获成功后,利用捕获估计的本地扩频码相位作为参考信号依据最小均方误差准则进行波束形成。仿真结果表明该抗干扰算法在零陷强干扰的同时使主波束指向导航信号来波方向,有效提高了阵列输出信干噪比,并降低了空时自适应处理对导航信号伪码相关峰形状和载波跟踪性能的影响。     

固定翼反潜巡逻机作战效能评估

运用改进的Topsis评估模型对反潜巡逻机的作战效能进行评估,主要是对指标权重的计算方法进行改进:综合考虑客观熵权和专家主观权重得到综合权重,通过客观的熵权信息来调整主观权重的偏差,使得反潜巡逻机作战效能的评价结果更为合理。实例分析表明,该方法能够主客观相结合,简单有效,具有一定的推广应用价值。     

改进柔性资源约束项目调度模型与粒子群算法

在资源受限项目调度问题中,将可再生资源进一步拓展为具有能力差异的柔性资源,建立考虑能力差异的柔性资源受限的多模式项目调度问题模型,该模型是对传统资源约束项目调度问题(RCPSP)更接近实际的拓展。提出了基于粒子群算法的求解算法,粒子群算法求解该模型的思路为,利用蒙特卡洛方法根据资源-能力矩阵与活动模式-能力矩阵得到活动模式-资源矩阵,将考虑能力差异的柔性资源受限的多模式项目调度问题转换为常规的多模式项目调度问题,然后利用基于任务序列与模式表示的粒子群算法对该多模式项目调度问题进行求解。用数值实例说明了模型的合理性与算法的有效性。     

Newsvendor bounds and heuristics for serial supply chains with regular and expedited shipping

We study an infinite‐horizon, N‐stage, serial production/inventory system with two transportation modes between stages: regular shipping and expedited shipping. The optimal inventory policy for this system is a top–down echelon base‐stock policy, which can be computed through minimizing 2N nested convex functions recursively (Lawson and Porteus, Oper Res 48 (2000), 878–893). In this article, we first present some structural properties and comparative statics for the parameters of the optimal inventory policies, we then derive simple, newsvendor‐type lower and upper bounds for the optimal control parameters. These results are used to develop near optimal heuristic solutions for the echelon base‐stock policies. Numerical studies show that the heuristic performs well. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

渐开线环形齿球齿轮传动时变刚度系数

为研究渐开线环形齿球齿轮传动过程中齿轮副间的接触力,基于Hertz弹性接触理论定义了齿面接触点的刚度系数;利用微分几何相关知识,分析了球齿轮的齿面特征,得到了实时啮合点主曲率半径计算公式;研究了重合度系数对啮合刚度的影响,结合球齿轮机构传动特点,推导出任意位置反向啮合点位置计算公式;最后通过一个实例说明球齿轮机构接触点刚度系数具有典型的时变特征.     

基于公平谓词法的JMS消息过滤改进算法

研究了JMS发布／订阅消息传递模式的工作机制,分析了JMS在对事件进行匹配时的过滤算法,针对该算法的不足提出了采用公平谓词法来改进JMS的消息过滤速度,改进方法对基于JMS的发布／订阅应用程序的开发具有一定的指导意义。     

基于神经网络的超精密机床伺服进给非线性模型辨识

以双轴Ｔ型结构的超精密金刚石车床的伺服进给系统为研究对象,采用自构造神经网络技术,建立了系统的非线性动态数学模型,为系统非线性控制与补偿提供参考模型     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

Global counterinsurgency and US army expansion: the case for recruiting foreign troops

Given the nature of global counterinsurgency operations, the demands of military expansion, and the need for cultural, linguistic, and regional expertise, the United States Army should evaluate the establishment of US-led foreign troop units for its evolving force structure. This article proposes the creation of an American foreign legion based upon the recruitment of US-led, ethnically homogeneous tribal force units to meet the grist mill of counterinsurgency operations. This structured approach would be more beneficial than the current reliance on a de facto American Foreign Legion, represented by private military contractors (PMCs), many of them comprised of foreigners. These PMCs carry a number of oversight, accountability, and legal risks not found in a fully integrated, and US-officered foreign legion. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, the South-West African Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (Koevoet), and the Kit Carson Scouts serve as relevant historical examples where foreign troops were used to supplement national manpower resources.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’