消防部队处置地震灾害的几点启示

消防部队处置地震灾害具有专业优势,也是地震抢险救援的主力军。通过总结汶川大地震应急救援成功经验,认为高效的组织指挥、周密的协同和有力的后勤保障是成功救援的前提和关键。从完善有关法规和救援机制、建立防灾救灾战略物资储备库、建设国家应急抢险救援队伍等几个方面提出了提高消防部队处置灾害能力的对策。     

当代革命军人核心价值观在警卫部队的实践

实践当代革命军人核心价值观是当前公安警卫部队思想政治建设的根本任务。正确把握当代革命军人核心价值观的科学内涵及其在警卫部队的具体表现,坚持“以人为本”、“和谐文化”、“依法治军”和“长效机制”的理念,对警卫部队实践当代革命军人核心价值观具有重要意义。     

消防部队在重特大灾害抢险救援中思想政治工作探析

消防部队要做好重特大灾害抢险救援中参战部队的思想政治工作,必须政治鼓动,切实从思想上提供保障;健全组织,切实从组织上提供保障;广泛宣传,切实从舆论导向上提供保障;心理干预,切实从预防机制上提供保障。     

论武警法学的建构

中国人民武装警察部队是我国武装力量的重要组成部分。武警理论研究、武警立法发展和武警执法实践都要求制定一部中国人民武装警察部队法。武警法是适用于武警部队的专门法,具有特殊性、专业性、独立性、分散性、交叉性的特点。武警法学具有自己独特的研究对象、研究方法、理论价值和科学体系,应该建构独立的武警法律学科,这是必然的发展趋势。     

Mimetic and normative isomorphism in the establishment and maintenance of independent air forces

Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.     

Filibustering from Africa to the Americas: non-state actors and empire

This article looks at dominant definitions of empire, in particular those emphasizing large polities as the sole agents of imperial expansion. By doing so, it draws attention to the overlooked role of filibusters: private, non-state actors who initiate unauthorized military endeavours, either in an attempt to carve out empires for themselves or for their home state. It demonstrates that filibustering is not a practice unique only to the Americas or to the nineteenth century as so much of the literature suggests. Lastly, it scrutinizes the cultural and historical impact of the phenomenon. In terms of the former, it argues that filibustering had an important literary and filmic influence. Regarding the latter, it advocates that it frequently led to further violent intercessions in many of the countries occupied and influenced a particular style of proto-fascistic and charismatic militarism.     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

The use of undercover military units in counter-terrorist operations: a historical analysis with reference to contemporary anti-terrorism

This article examines the use of specialised plain-clothes military units in counter-terrorism, concentrating on examples involving liberal-democratic states. It analyses the benefits and problems arising from clandestine military activity, focusing in particular on British army units (notably 14 Intelligence Company and the Force Research Unit in Northern Ireland). The article concludes by arguing that such formations have a clear utility – notably in gathering intelligence on terrorist groups – but other aspects of their role are inherently controversial (notably in cases where undercover soldiers use deadly force against suspected terrorists). It also states that plain-clothes military operations need to be conducted on the basis of accountability, both for strategic reasons, and also in accordance with the norms of liberal democracy.     

Exporting professionalism: US efforts to reform the armed forces in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, 1916–1933

Why did the United States, a country notorious for supporting coups and military dictatorships in Latin America during the Cold War, seek to depoliticize security forces in the Caribbean basin during the early twentieth century? Drawing from primary sources, I argue that this emphasis on military non-partisanship abroad stemmed from Progressive Era reforms popular at home. These reforms, which stressed bureaucratic efficiency via nonpartisan expertise, had become institutionalized within the US military and State Department and then channelled into the imperial administration of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. The State Department and Marine Corps attempted to replace local partisan armies with the kind of professional, nonpartisan armed forces that the US's own military had come to exemplify. That these civil-military reform efforts ultimately backfired should serve as a reminder of the difficulties inherent in using military interventions to transform coercive apparatuses and their societies.     

The missing dimension: IDF special operations forces and strategy in the Second Lebanon War

In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war.