【专题】人工智能装备质量监督效能研究

近年来,人工智能技术迅速发展和渐趋成熟,在装备领域的应用大放异彩,极大地拓展了传统装备性能,特别是自主性和智能化水平。但人工智能算法本身固有的逻辑推理性差、具有不可解释性和需要学习训练等特性给人工智能装备的质量监督带来了新挑战,现有评价手段的欠缺也使人工智能装备发展在实用可靠方面充满不确定性。本文在总结归纳人工智能装备新特性拓展和质量监督新挑战的基础上,重点围绕有效提升人工智能装备的质量监督展开研究。提出应在夯实基础能力设施建设、注重日常数据采集整理、灵活技术状态管控、研究有效评价手段、强化人才队伍建设和闭环质量信息反馈与利用等六方面加强人工智能装备质量监督的措施建议,以期为人工智能装备的发展建设提供参考。     

人工智能赋能军事训练

随着大数据、物联网和5G的不断发展,海量数据的获取变得越来越容易,人工智能技术利用GPU的强大计算能力和深度学习网络对高维数据和非线性模型的拟合能力,迎来了飞跃式发展,深刻改变着人类生产、生活和学习方式,出现了语音识别、机器翻译、无人驾驶及智能机器人等场景,计算、数据与模型的不断发展也成为推动人工智能前进的主要动力.本...     

INDISPENSABLE INTELLIGENCE AND INEVITABLE FAILURES

Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen. Stanford University Press, 2009. 300 pages, $35.     

脑与认知技术发展综述

脑与认知是利用神经形态计算来模拟生物大脑处理信息的过程,被认为是探究甚至实现人工智能的最直接技术路线,而且可以为人工神经网络研究提供基础导向,因为人类和动物先天的结构对其技能和习性有着决定性作用.对近期脑与认知的相关研究与成果进行了综合评述,并对未来发展趋势进行了展望.综述表明,类脑仿生研究与应用改进了人工智能系统...     

Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder

This article argues for the continued relevance of the work and theories of the British Geostrategist Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947). It asserts that commentators and scholars who seek to marginalise Mackinder have too often dismissed his theories without setting them in the context of their continued endorsement in crucial areas of the globe. After 1945, despite his theories being tainted by association with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, both Moscow and Washington recognised the utility of Mackinder’s work and tailored policy accordingly. The end of Cold War saw Mackinder fall out of favour as his model was deemed unsuitable for policy analysis by a number of influential thinkers. It is argued here that, in recent years, the arena of international politics has seen a rehabilitation of Mackinder, accompanied by a resurgence of interest in Geopolitics. Finally, the piece examines those areas of the contemporary globe where Mackinder’s influence is greatest.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.     

The Iraq Survey Group: From Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counterinsurgency

The discovery and elimination of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a focal point of the Coalition's strategy and operations in the aftermath of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. Despite the failure of the WMD mission to meet expectations after almost two years of intensive operations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was able to integrate multinational and multi-agency forces to provide detailed intelligence regarding the history of Iraq's WMD programs and to assist in the battle against insurgents. The ISG's experience raises the question of whether a standing intelligence force could become a key component in future counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts around the world.1 ¹The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Dept. of Defense, or the US Government. View all notes     

Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria,Prussia and Russia against Napoleon

This essay re-examines coalition warfare during the Napoleonic era by looking at the three eastern European powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia – how they interacted over time with France as well as each other, and how they managed French preponderance on the Continent. Before 1812, coalition warfare was dominated by eighteenth-century military and diplomatic attitudes: overall foreign political goals were ill-defined and were characterised by deep mistrust. The result was that the eastern powers pursued their own interests with little regard to coalition cohesion. If the coalition held together in 1813 and 1814, on the other hand, it was largely because individual powers' self-interest coincided with the overall objectives of the coalition – an increased determination to defeat Napoleon – along with a never before seen numerical superiority in allied troops. In this, Austria and especially Chancellor Metternich's role in juggling conflicting interests between the allies so that they could present, for the first time, a united front against France was fundamental.     

Militarisation of cooperation against mass migration – the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC)

As a result of the migration crisis of 2015–2016, the management of mass migration and border control became militarised in Central Europe, and this process has also reshaped the dynamics of multinational defence cooperation in the region. Accordingly, while the so-called Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) was created by Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2010 to support NATO and EU capability development projects via defence cooperation, after the migration crisis it became the major Central European forum for military cooperation against irregular mass migration. Although many defence officials in the region are not necessarily enthusiastic about this development, the Central European political environment and also practical defence considerations pushed the defence ministries of CEDC countries towards deeper cooperation on border control, as well as better coordination with ministries of interior affairs on the national and the regional levels.