Reading the Riot Act: Toward a More Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

ABSTRACT

The recent use of chemicals in warfare in Syria and Iraq illustrates that, despite the important work of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the world has not yet been totally successful in stopping the use of indiscriminate toxic agents in conflicts, either by states or non-state actors. Michael Crowley's excellent and timely new book, Chemical Control, analyzes the use of “riot control agents” (RCAs) and “incapacitating chemical agents” (ICAs), including launch and dispersal systems, by police, paramilitary, and military forces over the last decades and raises the challenging question about where the red line might be drawn between banned and permitted uses of chemicals. He discusses this problem not only in the context of the CWC, which allows use of RCAs for civilian riot control, but also in the context of international law, human rights, and criminal justice, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other disarmament and abolition regimes. He proposes a “holistic, three-stage approach” to addressing this issue “for effective regulation or prohibition of the weapon or weapon-related technology of concern.” As we approach the global abolition of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction in the next decade or even sooner, Chemical Control is helpful in better understanding and solving the dilemma of what's actually banned or permitted under international law, and precluding states undermining the chemical weapons ban.     

U.S. SPACE WEAPONS

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes.     

THE FUTURE OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT

The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) gave the future of biological disarmament new hope. It brought the BWC back closer to the core of multilateral efforts to combat the weaponization of disease, agreed to an intersessional work program for 2007–2010, created an implementation support unit, and revived the interrupted process of BWC evolution through extended understandings agreed at review conferences. However, its aims were deliberately modest. Having set their sights realistically low, delegations did not have to lower them much further. What was most important was to prevent U.S.-Iranian acrimony from paralyzing the conference. With deadlock once again narrowly averted, the conference had to clear away the debris left from past dissensions in order to open the way to constructive evolution for the treaty. In particular the conference avoided contentious subjects such as permanent organization and verification measures for the BWC; its institutional deficit and compliance problems remain. Successes and limitations of the conference are analyzed, as is its equivocal outcome on confidence-building measures. Developing on the endogenous principle, the BWC will continue to need constant attention. At the center of a complex edifice, the BWC must be kept sound, strong, and solid.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

ON THE USE OF TERROR WEAPONS VERSUS MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS IN AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Some of the most active arms races are taking place between developed and less developed countries. The inability of less developed countries to compete financially, as well as technologically, with developed countries may be forcing the former to acquire terror weapons (TWP). The Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s and the events of 9/11 proved that the use of TWP is no longer a mere threat; there are several organizations and countries that will not hesitate to use them. This study develops a model of resource allocation in an arms race between a developed country that is characterized by state‐of‐the‐art technology and high GDP, and a less developed country whose technological capability and GDP are much lower. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries that are engaged in the arms race. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use.     

Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

简述与《禁止化学武器公约》相关的生化融合技术

《禁止化学武器公约》是一项十分重要的国际公约。《公约》全面、切实地履行,对在全球范围禁止化学武器使用,防止化学武器扩散,减少化学武器对人类的危害具有重大而深远意义。然而,随着科技的发展,《公约》面临着新的挑战。特别是生物学和化学的发展与融合,对《公约》实施可能产生的影响日益明显。文章结合禁止化学武器组织科学咨询委员会向第三次《禁止化学武器公约》审议大会提交的报告,重点就与《公约》有关的化学与生物融合的技术问题进行了简要的归纳和分析。     

ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance.