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911.
Christopher M. Faulkner Joshua E. Lambert Jonathan M. Powell 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):641-659
ABSTRACTThis paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination. 相似文献
912.
Stephen Pampinella 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):721-743
As US counterinsurgency campaigns draw to a close, doctrine for asymmetric warfare written during the War on Terror has come under heavy criticism. While many have argued that this shift to ‘winning hearts and minds’ is evidence that the United States is taking humanitarianism and nation-building seriously, others argue that a wide gap exists between US counterinsurgency doctrine and the protection of civilians afflicted by conflict. In this article, I show that the latter is true by comparing theories of instrumental and communicative action to US doctrine for operational design, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. I argue that these texts treat the people as an object to be manipulated for the achievement of pre-determined self-interested strategic goals rather than members of a community that jointly designs operations to fulfill shared objectives. However, US doctrine does contain communicative elements that, if prioritized, would better support humanitarian and state-building objectives otherwise subordinated in the War on Terror. 相似文献
913.
ANDREA E OSTHEIMER 《African Security Review》2013,22(4):45-58
Guinea-Bissau's transition toward democracy has been violent and disruptive. Despite holding elections and attempts to promote economic and social development, the latest government, under President Yala, is not equipped to bring stability or even a more democratic state. A politicised military, inexperienced opposition and corrupt government officials have contributed to the current poverty and instability. Although unlikely to be deposed by the fragmented opposition, Yala is not secure within his own party and is likely to use his position to weaken his opponents. As a Catholic, Yala has been careful to avoid religious conflict by reassuring Muslim citizens that they will not be marginalised. The economy is precarious and poverty has not been addressed. Guinea-Bissau is dependent on foreign donors for its financial needs. Guinea-Bissau has begun military operations against rebels opposing the Senegalese government and the battles seem likely to continue to cause regional instability. Without external intervention political and economic development looks remote. 相似文献
914.
Shawn Russell 《African Security Review》2013,22(3):324-331
Analysis of the failures of African security forces generally focuses on structural issues such as corruption of senior leadership, insufficient equipment and training, and coup d’état fears driving mistrust of armies that are too strong or effective. However, less examined is the role that sub-state identity plays; using Libya, South Sudan, and Mali as case studies, this paper examines how ethnicity inhibits the development of national armies, divides them, and exposes a critical flaw that adversaries are able to exploit. Given the increasingly ethnic nature of conflict throughout the world, and the rising threat that ethnic conflicts in Africa pose to regional and Western partners, it may be prudent for researchers, policymakers and other stakeholders to examine the critical role that sub-state identity plays in undermining African security forces. 相似文献
915.
Nancy W. Gallagher 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):469-498
ABSTRACTSince the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is. 相似文献
916.
Abdurrahim Sıradağ 《African Security Review》2013,22(3-4):308-325
ABSTRACTTurkey has maintained its strategic relations with Africa at the highest level under recent AK Party governments in the field not only of low politics but also of high politics. For example, it opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 and signed military, defense and security pacts with more than 25 African countries. This article traces the deep historical and cultural relations with Africa behind its newly evolving foreign policy identity, arguing that its booming economic power has been a significant driving force in shaping a new security strategy. It examines what the growing security involvement means for both Turkey and Africa in order to contribute to the relevant literature through a holistic approach from both theoretical and conceptual perspectives. 相似文献
917.
Dennis M. Gormley 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):123-139
ABSTRACTThe dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions. 相似文献
918.
David O. Smith 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):99-105
ABSTRACTIn No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration. 相似文献
919.
Justin O. Smith 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):448-466
A comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy to attack the insurgent's logistic system was a key element in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The campaign of maritime interdiction required the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to attack LTTE arms smuggling, sea piracy, and maritime terrorism. The SLN degraded the insurgency's robust maritime logistical network while also devising tactics to engage the maritime insurgents who reacted with swarm and suicide boat tactics. The efforts of the SLN forced the Tamil Tigers to confront the government's final land offensives with diminished resources, thus collapsing a three decades’ old insurgency in a matter of months. 相似文献
920.
针对嵌入式浏览器信息传输的安全性问题和嵌入式软件的特点,介绍了SSL协议,提出了一种在嵌入式浏览器中实现对SSL协议支持的方法.通过分析影响SSL协议客户端性能的因素,对SSL的实现过程进行了适当的优化,使用会话恢复机制、只对服务器进行验证的简单握手模式、减少TCP调用次数和优化对批量数据加密算法等方法,实现了嵌入式浏览器对SSL协议的支持;并介绍了方法在嵌入式浏览器JARI_Browser中的实现过程.实际的应用验证了该方法的可行性和正确性. 相似文献