Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

SHINING A SPOTLIGHT ON THE SPACE RACE IN ASIA

Asia's Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, by James Clay Moltz. Columbia University Press, 2012. 290 pages, $35.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

论“空海一体战”与中国国家安全

“空海一体战”是美国的一种新型作战理论,是在20世纪80年代“空地一体战”等诸多战法及兵种妥协基础上形成的一种新型军事战略,旨在通过空海军力量的配合,进行近域作战,以抵消对手的反进入/区域拒止能力,取得战争的主动权与控制权.“空海一体战”作为美国战略重心东移的重要角力点与支撑要素,在美国亚太战略中的作用举足轻重,对亚太周边国家尤其是中国的国家安全构成重大威胁,为此有必要对其理论渊源、发展目标、策略行动及障碍缺陷进行剖析与解构,为中国维护国家安全,构建良好的国家安全环境提供战略储备与智力支持.     

Special Section: Nuclear Stability In South Asia

The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region.     

“This program will not be a threat to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China

Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects, on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration. Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article fills this gap.     

因情成梦,因梦成戏——由《牡丹亭》浅析汤显祖的戏剧创作观

汤显祖是明代著名的戏剧家,其戏剧作品历来为世人称道,在中国戏剧史上占有重要地位,因此,对其戏剧创作观的研究始终具有重要意义。结合汤显祖的作品以及他的创作经历,笔者认为他在《复甘义麓》的信中,提到的＂因情成梦,因梦成戏＂八字更是简单明确地概括了其戏剧创作观。作为＂临川四梦＂之一的《牡丹亭》,是汤显祖的代表作品。一部《牡丹亭》不仅奠定了汤显祖在明清戏曲史上无人可比的地位,同时也集中体现了汤显祖的戏剧创作理念。本文试以《牡丹亭》为例,论述汤显祖的戏剧创作观。     

略论中国传统法制结构与清朝的新疆治理

清朝对新疆的治理,虽然采用了＂从俗从宜＂的政策,但由于清王朝以儒家学说和传统法制为立国之本,因此,清朝治理新疆的政策和具体制度,也无不显现出中国传统法制结构的特征。