Multinational counterinsurgency: the Western intervention in the Boxer Rebellion 1900–1901

This article proposes a case study of the multinational counterinsurgency operations that occurred in China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900–1, to provide a better understanding of the political and military dynamics specific to this type of mission. The study focuses primarily on the nature of the cooperation on the ground, the various national approaches to counterinsurgency, and the asymmetry of strategic approach between the Westerners and the Chinese. A discussion is also proposed, highlighting that combined counterinsurgency is not per se an obstacle to the unity of command, but that politically international coalitions create unique challenges to counterinsurgency operations.     

Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency

This article examines the ambiguous role played by the Cyprus Police Force during the Greek Cypriot insurgency against Britain between 1955 and 1959. A multiethnic force policing a multiethnic society, the CPF struggled to fulfill its duties. Greek Cypriot officers became ineffective as sympathy for, or fear of insurgents undermined their ability to function. Some collaborated, others resigned. Those who stayed became targets of their own people. Turkish Cypriot officers, recruited in greater numbers to compensate for a reduction in Greek Cypriot officers, worked to enforce the law, but exacerbated intercommunal relations in doing so. In spite of the peculiar conditions present in Cyprus, the case has valuable implications for contemporary policymakers on the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of local police forces to restore law and order in ethnically divided societies.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

Warning whom,for which response?

In June 2000, the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted the Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX), with its two technical structures, namely the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC). MARAC is tasked with collecting and analysing data for the early detection and prevention of conflicts and crises. It currently consists of the Central Structure located at the ECCAS Executive Secretariat in Libreville (Gabon) and 31 Decentralised Correspondents spread throughout the ten member states of ECCAS. This article assesses the performance of MARAC in the light of its assigned objectives. Bearing in mind the peace and security challenges facing the central African sub-region, the central argument of this article is that while the establishment of MARAC is commendable, it flowed more from the logic and context of the establishment of similar mechanisms on the African continent during the same period than from any displayed capacity and/or readiness on the part of ECCAS to implement the recommendations due to emanate from such a structure.     

Ministries of peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa: rationale,functions and establishment

Abstract

This paper begins by explaining the concept of a culture of peace and contrasts it with a culture of violence. It argues that traditional ways of trying to achieve peace – based on force or threat of force – are costly, ineffective and of doubtful morality. At the same time, nonviolent means have achieved some formidable successes. The paper proposes the establishment of national ministries of peacebuilding to coordinate and implement the building cultures of peace in sub-Saharan Africa. The broad tasks and specific functions of such ministries are explained and some likely objections are answered. The paper concludes with a discussion of the necessary conditions for such ministries to be established and to be effective in building cultures of peace.     

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

President Barack Obama has pledged to secure the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was previously rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999. This article attempts to predict the potential implications of Washington's ratification for the treaty's future by analyzing the positions and options of the eight other essential holdouts. The authors conclude that without the United States to hide behind, facing domestic and international constraints, and lacking substantial strategic reasons to remain outside the treaty, most holdouts will move toward ratification. Nonetheless, the process is likely to be time consuming, and several of the key actors remain unpredictable.     

The Long-run Causal Relationship Between Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in China: Revisited

This paper re-examines the long-run causal relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in China over the period 1952–2010. An empirical econometric analysis based on a Barro-style growth model is conducted. By employing the Bartlett corrected trace test, which provides better approximations of the finite sample distribution to determine the rank of cointegration, the results support the existence of a single long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. Furthermore, it is confirmed that the cumulated shocks of military expenditure primarily originate from different components of shocks that relate to economic development rather than the other way round.     

Defense Expenditure and Income Inequality: Evidence on Co-integration and Causality for China

There are conflicting views as to the relationship between a nation’s defense expenditure (DE) and its population’s income inequality (INEQ). DE, always an important part of government budget, can easily crowd out transfer payments, necessary to improve INEQ; however, these payments may also create a demand that may raise the income levels of the lower income earners. Consequently, the relationship between DE and INEQ is an important question. This paper examines the relationship between DE and INEQ in China for the period of 1989–2012. Utilizing basic cointegration and causality tests, our objective is to add to the literature by providing evidence that China’s DE, in fact, do have an impact on INEQ.     

Comment: Why “an identified systemic model of the democracy‐peace nexus” does not persuade*

In their article in this journal, James, Solberg and Wolfson (1999) challenge our findings that two states are more likely to have peaceful relations if they are both democratic. They claim to develop a simultaneous system of two equations showing that peace and democracy foster each other, and that the effect of peace in encouraging democracy is stronger than that of democracy on peace. Their analysis, however, is flawed. Their research design employs measures of dispute and joint democracy that are inferior to those now common in the literature, and their equation for predicting peace is not properly specified. These problems distort their results. Even so, their results provide evidence of the pacific benefits of democracy. Analyses we conduct with a more completely specified model reveal stronger support for the democratic “ peace. Furthermore, a test of the effect of interstate conflict on democracy should be done at the national (or monadic) level of analysis; but James et al. perform a dyadic analysis. In a monadic test using vector autoregression, we find that disputes make no contribution to explaining the character of regimes. Even with their dyadic method, their finding that peace promotes democracy is not robust Including a crucial control variable, the ratio of militarily relevant national capabilities, that James et al. omitted, dramatically alters their findings.