高超声速飞行器倾侧转弯耦合控制策略

针对高超声速飞行器倾侧转弯过程中俯仰、偏航和滚动通道间的强烈耦合,提出一种耦合控制策略。针对高超声速飞行器快时变、非线性和强不确定性的控制问题,基于解析形式的非线性最优预测控制方法,采用分层设计思想设计了飞行器姿态控制系统,可较好满足高超声速飞行器的快速性要求;在分析了倾侧转弯飞行控制过程的主要影响因素及其影响规律的基础上,提出一种"降低攻角—快速滚转—拉起攻角"的耦合控制策略。对该控制策略对于高超声速飞行器的适用性进行了仿真分析,结果表明:所提耦合控制策略有效降低了偏航通道的控制需求,降低了倾侧转弯控制过程的失控风险,提高了控制系统的可靠性。     

适用于临近空间飞行器大变形的动网格策略

对于超大展弦比构型的低速临近空间飞行器而言,由于其在飞行过程中结构变形非常显著,因此基于计算流体力学的分析方法对于动网格提出了非常高的要求。为此,提出了一种适用于边界大变形的动网格策略,该种动网格基于映射的思想,将边界网格的位置变化以某种权重反映到流场网格,并更新网格节点位置。选取距离倒数的n次方作为权重,研究不同的权重指数n对网格变形的影响规律,然后开展了二维与三维动网格实例分析。结果表明,这种动网格方法能够很好地适用于大变形的情形,并能很好地保证变形后的网格质量。     

一种适用于临近空间飞行器大变形的动网格策略*(专题约稿)

对于超大展弦比构型的低速临近空间飞行器而言,在飞行过程中结构变形非常显著,基于计算流体力学的分析方法对于动网格提出了非常高的要求。本文提出一种适用于边界大变形的动网格策略,该种动网格基于映射的思想,将边界网格的位置变化以某种权重反映到流场网格,并更新网格节点位置。文章选取距离倒数的n次方作为权重,首先研究了不同的权重指数n对网格变形的影响规律,然后开展了二维与三维动网格实例分析。结果表明,这种动网格方法能够很好的适用于大变形的情形,并能很好的保证变形后的网格质量。     

应急器材柔性采购定价建模与求解

由于当前应急器材储备依然存在“多储”或“少储”风险,为提高储备效益,以企业经济效益与军队采购成本为优化目标,提出了应急器材柔性采购策略。通过建立企业储备策略与军队采购定价最优化模型,求解得到了在不同战争爆发概率及器材现货市场价格区间等外部环境因素下的军队最佳柔性定价及对应的企业最优储备策略,并通过实例分析验证了得出的决策结论。结果表明,最优策略的实施将有利于军队与企业共担应急器材数量储备风险。     

不断探寻夺取新胜利的“法宝”

中国共产党在领导中国人民不断前行的进程中,善于总结,勇于创新,不断探寻出攻坚克难的“法宝”,夺取了一个又一个胜利。在新时期,党将继续保持这一优良传统,为实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦而奋勇前进。     

加拿大与中国双语教育评价比较研究

双语教育评价是双语教育过程中一个不可或缺的环节,关系到双语教育的成败。加拿大双语教育取得了举世瞩目的成就,全面研究加拿大双语教育评价对我国双语教育实践发展有一定的借鉴价值。研究首先系统梳理了加拿大与中国双语教育评价,在此基础上比较分析了两国双语教育评价的异同点及背后深层次的原因,最后针对我国双语教育评价中存在的问题提出了相应的建议。     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia

While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India's relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

Guns–butter tradeoff in contemporary China

This study offers an investigation of the relationship between defense and social spending in the People's Republic of China. In particular, three consecutive questions are answered here. Does a warfare–welfare tradeoff exist in China's budgetary allocation? Is it positive or negative? What is the causal direction involved? By applying a vector autoregression analysis for the period of 1952–2006, this study finds a unidirectional crowd-out effect going from defense to social spending.