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191.
Peter M. Sales 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):93-97
Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society. 相似文献
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The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5 Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p. Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3 相似文献
195.
Martin C. McGuire 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5-6):529-534
This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years. 相似文献
196.
Beatrice Heuser 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(4):858-876
Did participants in small wars in the period 1775–1831 learn from previous or contemporary examples? While this is difficult to prove for participants who left no written records, there is considerable evidence in existing publications by practitioners that they did indeed draw out lessons from recent insurgencies, either from their own experience or from events elsewhere which they studied from afar, especially the Spanish Guerrilla, which had already become legendary. Most authors showed an interest in how to stage insurgencies rather than in how to quell them. Even then, transfer did not come in a package of tactics-cum-values, but in each case in different configurations. 相似文献
197.
在“零伤亡”作战思想的指引下,随着计算机、人工智能等技术的日臻成熟,无人机的发展风起云涌。近年来,无人机在战术运用方面更是突破了传统的侦察领域,逐步涉足攻击甚至电子攻击等领域。通过回顾无人机在近代历次军事冲突中的运用,分析无人机运用于电子战的优势,探讨无人机在电子战中的运用及可能的运用情况,最后指出无人机运用于电子战后对未来电子战的影响。 相似文献
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电子战仿真数字系统模型及设计方法 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
阐述了在EW 系统建模、仿真和评估中采用电子战数字系统模型(EWDSM)的意义。结合电子战系统仿真评估的特点,讨论了EWDSM 在设计时采用的方法,如面向对象的分析方法的类层次和类结构,以及基于HLA/RTI的分布仿真协议的分布式计算环境的仿真系统设计。 相似文献
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Per Marius Frost-Nielsen 《Contemporary Security Policy》2017,38(3):371-397
Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations. 相似文献