An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Information security: Designing a stochastic‐network for throughput and reliability

Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

A search game taking account of attributes of searching resources

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

拦截高速机动目标的捕获区及微分对策导引律

针对高速机动目标拦截场景,研究末制导段捕获区存在条件及微分对策导引律问题.建立弹目相对运动模型并引入控制动力学模型,采用终端投影方法对相对运动模型进行降阶处理;基于微分对策理论推导一种解析形式捕获区,并具体到直/气复合控制导弹对机动目标的拦截中,该捕获区的存在能够保证对任意机动目标进行准确捕获;重新选取性能指标,将目标...     

集群搜索对策理论在搜索-规避对抗中的应用

使用对策论的观点和方法 ,结合搜索论的知识 ,建立了一类搜索 -规避对抗对策模型 .对模型的结论做了系统分析 ,考虑了对策双方的最优策略及使用 .     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Constrained minimax optimization of continuous search efforts for the detection of a stationary target

Analytical resolution of search theory problems, as formalized by B.O. Koopman, may be applied with some model extension to various resource management issues. However, a fundamental prerequisite is the knowledge of the prior target density. Though this assumption has the definite advantage of simplicity, its drawback is clearly that target reactivity is not taken into account. As a preliminary step towards reactive target study stands the problem of resource planning under a min–max game context. This paper is related to Nakai's work about the game planning of resources for the detection of a stationary target. However, this initial problem is extended by adding new and more general constraints, allowing a more realistic modeling of the target and searcher behaviors. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Alleviating time inconsistent behaviors via a competition scheme

Under quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.