航天器交会型轨道追逃策略的滚动时域优化

针对航天器自由时域交会型轨道追逃过程中的测量误差等不确定性对交会的影响,提出了一种基于滚动时域优化的高时效策略求解方法。根据微分对策理论推导得到博弈鞍点控制策略,并对问题进行等价转换;通过预先离线求解开环鞍点策略,将问题初始状态和相应的解作为样本以进行神经网络训练,训练后的网络结构可以快速得到相应问题的近似解。为了更好地应对博弈环境中的测量噪声,基于神经网络结构设计了滚动时域求解框架,并通过周期性的滚动求解最终实现对逃逸航天器的交会。数值仿真表明,所提出的策略可以有效应对测量噪声不确定性,且相比于文献中已有的策略,计算耗时可从分钟级降至秒级。     

一类对固定目标的集群搜寻对策问题及求解

利用集群搜索对策的理论与方法 ,建立了集群对固定目标的一类搜索对策模型 ,给出了集群的ε -最优搜寻策略 ,并考虑了其在搜索过程中的应用     

空天防御作战规划问题研究

从技术与作战结合的角度,系统分析空天防御作战系统和对抗特点等问题,构建了"态势组态—目标排序—目标分配—冲突动态最优预测"新型作战规划方法,提出"博弈控制理论与方法",论述了空天防御作战规划方法论。对空天防御作战规划理论研究有一定参考价值,为发展空天防御作战规划系统提供了研究思路和技术支撑。     

The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions.     

Rendezvous search on labeled networks

Two players are independently placed on a commonly labelled network X. They cannot see each other but wish to meet in least expected time. We consider continuous and discrete versions, in which they may move at unit speed or between adjacent distinct nodes, respectively. There are two versions of the problem (asymmetric or symmetric), depending on whether or not we allow the players to use different strategies. After obtaining some optimality conditions for general networks, we specialize to the interval and circle networks. In the first setting, we extend the work of J. V. Howard; in the second we prove a conjecture concerning the optimal symmetric strategy. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 256–274, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10011     

军事欺骗战法分析的数学方法-应用

针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法。该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定。对理论成果的初步应用表明：通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法。     

空降兵师(团)登岛作战兵力分配模型

通过结合空降兵师(团)级登岛作战的战术特点,确立了遮断点的单点和联合价值的指标体系,建立了以联盟博弈为基础的兵力分配初步模型,然后以Shapley值作为此联盟博弈的解,结合投放过程中的兵力损耗,得到一个合理的兵力分配方案,从而建立了师(团)级空降登岛作战的兵力分配模型和算法.     

基于成品油有限竞争市场的军油筹措战略研究

对国家成品油市场进行分析,认为目前国内成品油市场是典型的双寡头垄断有限竞争市场。通过对成品油市场主体厂商行为博弈的讨论,得出产量博弈的状况近期不会出现,价格博弈将使企业走入囚徒困境的结论。根据分析针对性地提出军油筹措战略,为相关决策提供参考。     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.