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排序方式: 共有163条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
151.
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以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。 相似文献
153.
Gilles Grandjean 《Defence and Peace Economics》2017,28(2):137-149
We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately. 相似文献
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Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013 相似文献
156.
Mustapha Bouhtou Alexander Grigoriev Stan van Hoesel Anton F. van der Kraaij Frits C.R. Spieksma Marc Uetz 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(4):411-420
We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs must be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers, and after the tariffs have been determined, the clients route their demands independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX‐hard. Moreover, we analyze the effect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an m approximation and a (1 + lnD)‐approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless P = NP, and we prove the existence of an n‐approximation algorithm. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
157.
摘要:为在根本上提高作战决策质量,从行为学角度入手,以指挥员这一“人”为中心,并结合认知科学、心理学等知识对指挥员作战决策行为进行研究。从博弈角度出发,通过引入EWA模型,对指挥员作战决策行为进行分析和优化。结果表明,EWA模型,特别是加入“老练”指挥员后的模型能够明显改善指挥员决策行为,对指挥员,尤其是经验匮乏的指挥员决策行为表现有着重要的作用。 相似文献
158.
随着防空C3I系统的发展,防空作战决策的过程较以往更为自动化,用于生成各种作战辅助决策方案的计算机模型也具备随着作战环境改变所表现出一定的自适应调整的特征.影响防空作战决策结果正确性的因素众多,表现这些因素的信息有些是冲突的,为得到更为准确、有效的决策方案,各类冲突信息的处理成为防空作战的核心问题.构造了一种在冲突信息环境下基于对策理论的融合模型,以对策理论的相关算法实现了融合中心各类信息的交互决策.实践表明,这一融合模型能有效地解决防空作战决策中各类信息的综合处理问题,具有一定的实用价值. 相似文献
159.
马绪荣 《国防科技大学学报》1993,15(4):96-102
本文提出了向量优超的概念,给出了二人零和对策等价的定义,得到了二人零和对策等价的两个充要条件及三个充分条件并应用本文的理论,给出了二人零和对策混合鞍点的一个新算法。 相似文献
160.
无线自组织网络中的跨层攻击具有比单层攻击更强的隐蔽性、更好的攻击效果或更低的攻击成本.为了检测无线自组织网络中的跨层攻击,提出了一种基于博弈论的攻击检测模型.由于攻击不可避免地会对各协议层的参数造成影响,因此模型从协议层攻防博弈的角度,建立起相应的策略矩阵和支付矩阵,并通过均衡分析得到该模型的混合策略纳什均衡解.仿真结... 相似文献