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21.
An attacker‐defender model for analyzing the vulnerability of initial attack in wildfire suppression 下载免费PDF全文
Wildfire managers use initial attack (IA) to control wildfires before they grow large and become difficult to suppress. Although the majority of wildfire incidents are contained by IA, the small percentage of fires that escape IA causes most of the damage. Therefore, planning a successful IA is very important. In this article, we study the vulnerability of IA in wildfire suppression using an attacker‐defender Stackelberg model. The attacker's objective is to coordinate the simultaneous ignition of fires at various points in a landscape to maximize the number of fires that cannot be contained by IA. The defender's objective is to optimally dispatch suppression resources from multiple fire stations located across the landscape to minimize the number of wildfires not contained by IA. We use a decomposition algorithm to solve the model and apply the model on a test case landscape. We also investigate the impact of delay in the response, the fire growth rate, the amount of suppression resources, and the locations of fire stations on the success of IA. 相似文献
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通过不同时期国家战略部署、科研发展情况及经济承受能力对装备经费分配的影响分析,采用博弈的方法,建立了装备科研、购置和维修费之间的比例关系优化模型,给出了寻求纳什均衡点的迭代算法,并进行了仿真计算.仿真结果证明了该方法的可行性与正确性. 相似文献
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装备采办中的讨价还价博弈模型 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
竞争性谈判是一种重要的武器装备采办方式,军方与承包商之间的谈判是一个重复博弈过程,双方谈判的本质是讨价还价。分析了轮流出价的讨价还价模型,对轮流出价博弈的子博弈精炼均衡进行了论述;在轮流出价模型的基础上建立了同时出价的讨价还价模型,并对2种模型的特点进行了分析;通过案例对2个模型的均衡结果进行了对比。分析结果显示:同时出价的讨价还价模型更能有效解决实际问题,更具有现实意义。 相似文献
24.
The nucleolus solution for cooperative games in characteristic function form is usually computed numerically by solving a sequence of linear programing (LP) problems, or by solving a single, but very large‐scale, LP problem. This article proposes an algebraic method to compute the nucleolus solution analytically (i.e., in closed‐form) for a three‐player cooperative game in characteristic function form. We first consider cooperative games with empty core and derive a formula to compute the nucleolus solution. Next, we examine cooperative games with nonempty core and calculate the nucleolus solution analytically for five possible cases arising from the relationship among the value functions of different coalitions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010 相似文献
25.
In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
26.
Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
27.
Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it. 相似文献
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Ryusuke Hohzaki 《海军后勤学研究》2008,55(1):76-90
This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008 相似文献