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Kensaku Kikuta 《海军后勤学研究》2004,51(7):977-993
There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004. 相似文献
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火力运用对策空间模型 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
根据空 -地作战的特点 ,提出了软、硬火力单位的概念 ,根据模型提出了作战指数、生存指数 ,为双方的实力与“保卫目标”的安全度分析提供了数量依据 ;根据微分对策和战术原则提出了规范作战模式等概念 ,为构造火力运用、兵力数量需求等算法搭起一个框架。 相似文献
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Marco Slikker 《海军后勤学研究》2006,53(4):235-242
We study sequencing situations with a fixed initial order and linear cost functions. Cost savings can be obtained by rearranging jobs. Next to finding an optimal order, an additional issue is formed by the division of these savings. Cooperative game theory studies this issue. A common assumption states that cooperation between players is restricted to groups that are connected according to the initial order. The value of disconnected groups is defined additively over their connected components. In this paper we allow players in disconnected coalitions to switch places as long as they do not hurt the players not in the coalition under consideration. The resulting games are called relaxed sequencing games. Although they have been studied before, no general results on stable profit divisions have been derived so far. In this paper we prove that relaxed sequencing games have a nonempty core, i.e., they all have stable profit divisions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 相似文献
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Kjell Hausken 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):525-531
Kovenock and Roberson's [2011] comment provides initial work which has the potential, when suitably extended, to advance the research frontier. Kovenock and Roberson's paper consists of three sections. The first section is an interesting introduction. The second section, titled ‘Model and Main Result,’ provides no contribution beyond Hausken [2008a]. It consists of Equations (1)–(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken, and Equation (11) which is equivalent to the utility requirements u???0 and U???0 provided after Equation (17) in Hausken. The third section provides interesting ideas about mixed-strategy equilibria that can be extended in future research. 相似文献
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以网络舆情传播过程中大部分人对事实不了解为前提,在这部分群体内构建基于不完全信息环境的两人对称演化博弈模型。提出了两人对称博弈矩阵来决定个体策略的选择,建立了复制动态方程说明不同策略群体比例的演化方向,演化时引入个体的记忆长度,根据设定的交互规则更新各自的观点值及记忆列表。仿真分析模型表明,在此环境中很容易产生羊群行为,群体内的个体都选择盲从并且观点保持一致。此外,羊群行为的集聚产生受多种因素影响,主要与采取分析策略的交互利益、成本系数以及记忆长度有关。本文对科学分析引导网络舆情的传播有一定实际意义。 相似文献
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Firms form various alliances or use brand extensions to enter new markets in order to improve their operational efficiency and create a positive spillover. However, they do not always know the implications of these strategies for market entry and multimarket competition because the sale of products in one market can have negative spillover effects on product sales in other markets. We present an analytical framework to examine whether and how (i.e., by choosing alliance entry or independent entry) competing firms should enter a market in a situation where market spillovers occur when a firm enters a spillover-producing market to sell products that may increase or decrease the consumers' willingness to pay for products in the primary market. Our analysis shows that the operational efficiency (or quality differentiation ability) of firms in a spillover-producing market varies, and hence, the impact of market spillovers differs for firms. We identify the key factors, such as bargaining power, brand value difference in the primary market, and the extent of efficiencies and spillovers, that determine the firms benefitting from the different entry strategies. Specifically, we show that firms would be more willing to choose an alliance strategy to enter a spillover-producing market if the negative spillover is small and alliance efficiency is high. In contrast, if an alliance entry is not favored, the firms' relative operational efficiency is crucial for them to decide whether to enter the market independently under moderate spillover conditions. Finally, we show the implications of market entry strategies for managers. 相似文献
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随着中美实力差距不断缩小和信息技术的发展与扩散,网络安全成为中美新的竞争点和摩擦点,中美在网络安全问题上展开新一轮的博弈,具体体现为网络空间治理权之争、中美网络安全战略博弈和网络技术优势的夺取。 相似文献
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